Unveiling Russia’s Covert Use of Western Technology in Military Hardware

Despite efforts to develop indigenous military technologies, Russia has heavily depended on Western technology, spanning across various equipment types, including tactical radios, drones, and precision long-range munitions. This reliance was notably highlighted following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and has become more pronounced during the ongoing conflict with Ukraine.

Russia’s efforts to acquire Western technology for its military hardware have been both overt and covert, highlighting a complex network of procurement and evasion of international sanctions. This reliance on foreign technology encompasses a wide range of military systems, including cruise missiles, communication systems, and electronic warfare complexes. A significant challenge in these efforts is the presence of export controls on many of these components, particularly those manufactured by U.S. companies. Despite these controls, Russia’s military-industrial complex has demonstrated a capability to evade restrictions, acquiring at least 450 different kinds of unique foreign-made components across 27 of its most modern military systems. These include sophisticated items like French thermal imaging arrays and U.S.-made microelectronics​​.

The response from Western governments to Russia’s actions, particularly in Ukraine, has indeed been a multifaceted approach of imposing sanctions. These sanctions, targeting both Russia’s economy and military capabilities, have included restrictions on sensitive microchips and other critical technologies essential for modern warfare. However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been a subject of scrutiny.

The United States, in coordination with the G7 and other international partners, has implemented over 300 sanctions aimed at targeting Russia’s ability to circumvent these restrictions, affecting their military-industrial supply chains and future energy revenues. This includes sanctions on individuals and entities, with touchpoints in more than 20 countries, to hold Russia accountable for its actions. These measures are part of a broader effort to degrade Russia’s capacity to wage war against Ukraine and to isolate it from key inputs needed to equip its military​​.

Despite these measures, Russia has developed strategies to bypass sanctions, often utilizing third-party countries as intermediaries. Sanctions evasion networks have been identified, linking the Russian military-industrial complex with newly incorporated companies, often based in or linked to manufacturers, banks, and other businesses in sanctions-imposing countries. This has led to the problem of “whack-a-mole,” where sanctioning a person or a company leads to another appearing in its place, directed by Russian or affiliated individuals​​.

The enforcement of these sanctions has proven challenging, as EU-sanctioned goods still find their way to Russia, often through third countries. This has been particularly notable in the case of high-tech goods and dual-use products that can be used for military purposes. Countries like Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have been mentioned as intermediaries in this process. The European Union and its member states are actively working to monitor and identify circumvention shipments and other sanctions violations. The enforcement of sanctions largely depends on the individual member countries, leading to a varying degree of effectiveness across the bloc​​.

Additionally, the U.S. government has ramped up efforts to counter sanctions evasion around the world. This includes designating over 30 third-country individuals and companies connected to Russia’s sanctions evasion efforts, related to arms trafficking and illicit finance​​.

The legacy of the Soviet Union

Historically, Russia, and before that, the Soviet Union, have engaged in extensive efforts to acquire Western technology, often through covert means. This pattern of behavior, deeply ingrained over decades, reflects a systemic approach to circumventing international sanctions and export controls.

During the Soviet era, the state heavily relied on Western technology and know-how to develop its economy and military capabilities. The Soviet Union’s economic model faced inherent limitations due to centralized planning and the absence of market mechanisms, which stifled innovation and technical progress. This dependency was not due to a lack of quality in Soviet scientific research but rather the limitations imposed by the absence of a market-based economy and incentives. The Soviet system, with its centralized control, lacked the dynamics of the free market, which is crucial for fostering innovation and technological development. As a result, the Soviet Union often imported skilled personnel, technology, and know-how from Western countries.

This dependence on Western technology continued throughout the Soviet era, with a significant portion of Soviet technology being of Western origin. Between 1917 and 1930, virtually all Soviet technology originated in the West, and between 1946 and 1965, most of the progress in Soviet innovation depended on scaling up existing plants and technologies imported from the West. This included major advancements in sectors such as mining, oil, chemicals, machine building, aircraft, and communications. Prominent Western firms were heavily involved in the Soviet economy, bringing their technicians, machinery, and capital to the Soviet Union.