Ukraine’s Counteroffensive: A Calculated Strategy and the Kremlin’s Dilemma

When we think about strategic warfare, a statement often quoted is, “Do not give your enemy problems. Give them dilemmas.” This phrase is increasingly being recited, almost to the point of being a cliché, especially in online discussions revolving around the military. The reason is that it carries a potent philosophy at its core. While problems usually have solutions, dilemmas present their subjects with two bad options to choose from. The essence of this theory has been beautifully illustrated by Ukrainian strategists in their counteroffensive against Russia. Over the past eight months, Ukraine has masterfully woven this approach into their strategies, with some notable applications in the Kherson and east of Kharkiv incidents of 2022.

Currently, we find ourselves in the middle of the third chapter of this intriguing narrative. Ukraine’s counteroffensive is underway, marking a significant turn in the conflict’s dynamics. However, the world’s gaze, engrossed in the daily territorial shifts, must also appreciate the earlier preparation, for it is this preparation that will determine whether Ukraine’s counterattack will make limited progress or transform into a nightmarish defeat for Russia.

The crucial yet often overlooked players in this strategic game are the secondary units. To comprehend their role and significance, one needs to delve into the basics of defense strategy.

As a defender, your central objective is to balance your vulnerabilities evenly, since your opponent would likely target your weakest point with overwhelming force, rendering your defenses elsewhere irrelevant. In practice, this calls for a delicate balancing act between deploying soldiers on the frontline and maintaining mobile secondary units that can cover multiple locations at short notice. If the Kremlin were to literally divide troops in this manner, the war could conclude rapidly.

Regardless of how Russia distributes its soldiers on the front lines, Ukraine’s offensive advantage allows it to achieve considerable numerical superiority. The offensive party has the power to decide where to engage. In other words, rather than dispersing troops aimlessly, Ukraine can accumulate massive troop masses along a single vector.

If Russia tries to match Ukraine on the front lines by congregating a substantial number of troops at the same location, Ukraine simply bypasses this area, leaving the rest of the frontlines vulnerable. Conversely, if Russia spreads out its forces, Ukraine can still secure local superiority, and even when Russian forces are abundant, they are there to counterbalance the area’s natural vulnerabilities.

Both of these situations do not bode well for Russia’s aspiration to capture the territory. Instead, the ideal strategy involves a split allocation between dedicated frontliners and mobile secondary units. Each of these components plays a unique role. The frontline soldiers must brace for a challenging ordeal, and if the attacker decides to target their position, they need to hold on until the secondary units can arrive and level the numbers. This strategic division of troops sets up a trade-off, influencing the course of the war.

Interestingly, Ukraine’s shaping operations have exploited this strategic framework. Shaping operations refer to the preliminary actions leading up to the main event or attack. Over the last six months, Ukraine has been tactically executing its shaping operations. These activities, while seemingly on the surface, actually served to further complicate Russia’s strategic planning.

Moreover, Ukraine’s emphasis on operational security and their push for a social media blackout for their troops’ movements also play into the dilemma for Russia. While these actions are overt, their impact is deep and strategic. The Kremlin, facing a shortage of troops, is fully aware of Ukraine’s actions but has yet to find an effective way to counter them.

This approach is not new or innovative but has been proven effective in numerous historical instances. The D-Day invasion, for instance, was successful because the Allies had managed to convince the Germans that the main attack was going to be in Calais rather than Normandy. The same principle applies here. By intensifying its shaping operations, Ukraine is leaving Russia to second-guess where the main attack is going to be.