The Strange Case of the Chinese Ferry Zhong Hua Fu Xing: A Study of China’s Maritime Strategy

The peculiar case of the Chinese ferry Zhong Hua Fu Xing on April 13th was noted by international observers. This commercial vessel was initially charted on its typical route between Dalian and Yantai, as per its Automatic Identification System (AIS). However, to the surprise of many, the ferry was spotted a few hours later, 700km south near Taiwan, heading towards Fujian province. The vessel carried People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marines and participated in a PLA amphibious assault exercise, launching and recovering amphibious vehicles at sea. This startling event leads us to two questions: Why was a commercial ferry off its official route, and why was a civilian ship carrying out military exercises?

To understand this peculiar occurrence, we must delve into the strategic uses of such commercial vessels in China’s maritime strategy. China has made it clear that these ferries are integral to the nation’s plans for a possible invasion of Taiwan, acting as a force multiplier in sealift capability and generating tactical ambiguity.

China’s Strategic Shipping Companies

Since 2012, all major shipping companies in China have been integrated into the “strategic projection support ship fleets.” These fleets are split into three main theater commands: the Northern, Eastern, and Southern, responsible for the principal maritime theaters surrounding China, including the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow and Bohai Seas.

These vessels are part of China’s maritime militia fleet, like the fishing vessels involved in the South China Sea disputed islands standoffs. While fishing vessels excel in gray area operations, ferries exhibit superior sealift capabilities.

Roll-On Roll-Off Ferries: A History and Context

The most efficient ferries in terms of transportation within the strategic support fleet are the Roll-On Roll-Off (RoRo) ferries. First developed during World War II for the Dunkirk evacuation, these vessels are equipped with multiple access ramps, enabling quick embarkation and disembarkation of wheeled vehicles.

RoRo ferries are used worldwide by militaries to redeploy their units. The US Navy operates the Shughart class, and the UK has used commercial ferries during the Malvinas/Falklands operation. The ferries’ design makes them ideal for transporting supply trucks, tanks, and armored vehicles.

China’s largest RoRo ferry can hold up to 300 heavy-duty trailers, capable of disembarkation in a matter of hours. This capacity translates into an unloading ability of up to 2,000 tons per hour. According to a study by the PLA Logistics Academic Research Center, a single combined brigade consumes around 600,000 kg (1 million lb) of fuel per day. Under optimal conditions, one of these ships can supply the equivalent of three days’ worth of fuel in just one hour.

RoRo Ferries Versus Purpose-Built Amphibious Warships

When compared to purpose-built amphibious warships such as the US Navy’s San Antonio Class, RoRo ferries can carry a larger number of vehicles. The San Antonio Class, costing $1.5 billion each, has approximately 25,000 sq feet of vehicle space (2450Sqm). In contrast, the Bohai Hengda, China’s largest RoRo ferry costing $29 million each, can transport almost four times the number of vehicles.

Though commercial RoRo vessels may not survive in a combat scenario, amphibious warships like the San Antonio are equipped with defensive capabilities that make them more suited for contested sea space operations. However, in the case of an invasion of Taiwan, where it only takes a few hours to traverse the strait, and where there may be a need for surprise and speed, the risk of using commercial vessels may be deemed acceptable. Additionally, these commercial ferries also provide the advantage of plausible deniability, creating a level of ambiguity around their use that can confuse or delay enemy responses.

Force Multiplier and Tactical Ambiguity

The PLA’s decision to incorporate commercial ferries into their plans serves two strategic purposes: they act as a force multiplier, augmenting the PLA’s sealift capability significantly. Secondly, these commercial vessels generate tactical ambiguity, complicating the enemy’s decision-making process.

As a force multiplier, the addition of commercial vessels allows the PLA to increase their shipping capacity at a fraction of the cost, time, and resources needed to construct purpose-built amphibious warships. This increased capacity could prove critical in a rapid and large-scale operation, such as a possible invasion of Taiwan.

The presence of commercial vessels in military operations also creates a level of tactical ambiguity. These vessels are not traditionally considered military threats and can blend in with civilian maritime traffic. This can complicate the decision-making process of an enemy force, creating uncertainty about whether to engage these vessels and potentially delaying their response.

Conclusions

The incident involving the ferry Zhong Hua Fu Xing demonstrates how China has blended commercial and military operations in its maritime strategy. This approach, which includes the use of commercial RoRo ferries, allows the PLA to increase their sealift capabilities cost-effectively while also creating tactical ambiguity that could complicate an enemy’s decision-making process.

While this strategy comes with its risks, namely the vulnerability of commercial vessels in combat scenarios, the PLA seems to deem these risks acceptable in specific contexts, such as a possible invasion of Taiwan. As such, the continued observation of China’s maritime strategy, particularly its use of commercial vessels, is critical for understanding their broader military intentions and capabilities.