The Shifting Sands of U.S. Intervention Policy in Iraq: A Retrospective Examination

The intricacies of U.S. foreign policy have always been an enigma, shrouded in the paradox of democracy promotion and pragmatic national interest. No more is this complexity visible than in the U.S. engagement in Iraq over the past few decades. A controversial and highly debated issue, the decisions taken during the Bush Administration’s handling of the 1991 Iraqi uprisings continue to reverberate in U.S.-Iraq relations, shaping the diplomatic, political, and humanitarian landscape. This op-ed aims to critically assess these decisions, unearthing their implications, and distilling lessons for future foreign policy.

Historical Context

The decades leading up to 1991 were tumultuous for Iraq. In 1979, Saddam Hussein’s seizure of power inaugurated an era marked by aggressive authoritarianism, political repression, and large-scale warfare. His regime’s ambitions were clear in the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), a bloody conflict that drew U.S. attention towards the region.

Before the uprisings, Iraq’s relationship with the U.S. was complicated. The Reagan administration, viewing Iran as a more significant threat, strategically aligned with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, indirectly supporting Hussein’s regime. However, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 prompted an international backlash, leading to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition that swiftly defeated Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm. With Hussein’s regime weakened but still in power, the stage was set for the 1991 uprisings.

The 1991 Uprisings

The revolts, often known as the Sha’aban Intifada in the South and the March Uprising in the North, began in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War. The Shia majority in the South and the Kurds in the North, long suppressed by Hussein’s Sunni-dominated regime, saw an opportunity to overthrow the weakened dictator.

Despite the rebels’ determination, they lacked adequate organization, leadership, and international support. The global community, particularly the U.S., played a decisive role. The U.S. response was a cautious, calculated non-intervention, a stance dictated by both geopolitical and domestic considerations. The Bush administration’s policy had profound implications, not just on the uprising, but for future U.S.-Iraq relations and Iraq’s internal political and social landscape.

The U.S. Policy of Non-Intervention

The Bush Administration’s response to the uprising was markedly cautious. The U.S. publicly distanced itself from the rebels, opting for a policy of non-intervention in Iraq’s internal affairs. U.S. military officials downplayed the significance of the revolts. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney’s ambivalent remark, “I’m not sure whose side you’d want to be on,” epitomized this stance. The Pentagon’s view, communicated through officials like Rear Admiral John Michael McConnell, Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that Saddam would ultimately prevail due to the rebels’ lack of organization and leadership.

The U.S. believed that any intervention could destabilize the fragile coalition it had formed against Iraq and potentially lead to unwelcome ramifications like the “Lebanonization of Iraq” or the emergence of Iranian-backed Shias in power. There was also reluctance to recommit U.S. soldiers to another round of fighting after the recent Gulf War. Thus, the U.S., despite maintaining a watchful eye, refrained from providing direct assistance to the uprising.

The Unraveling of the Uprising

The U.S. policy of non-intervention had immediate and long-term effects. The rebels, having hoped for American support, found themselves alone, facing the brutal might of Saddam’s loyalist forces. Despite this, the Bush Administration warned Iraqi authorities against the use of chemical weapons but equivocated on the use of helicopter gunships.

However, the rebels’ lack of international support ultimately proved fatal. Saddam’s forces crushed the revolts ruthlessly, effectively extinguishing any immediate hope for a change in power in Iraq. The Bush administration’s non-intervention policy, to a great extent, enabled the continuation of Saddam’s regime.

The Post-Uprising Phase and Iraq’s Political Future

In the aftermath of the crushed uprisings, the Bush Administration made it clear that the removal of Saddam was not an objective of the U.S. or the coalition. This stance was reiterated by President George H.W. Bush himself, stating, “I made clear from the very beginning that it was not an objective of the coalition or the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.”

This non-intervention policy inadvertently fostered a climate of mistrust between Iraq’s population and the U.S., influencing future interactions. It was later cited by many analysts as a reason why the Iraqi Shia population did not welcome U.S.-led coalition forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, remaining reluctant to rise against Saddam until Baghdad fell.

The Repercussions of the Abandonment of the Uprising

The U.S. abandonment of the uprising had far-reaching consequences. It reinforced a notion of betrayal in the minds of Iraqis. The fact that the U.S. stood by as Saddam’s regime ruthlessly crushed the uprising severely damaged the trust between Iraq’s population and the United States. Consequently, the once-hopeful rebel factions were left with deep-seated resentment and skepticism towards the United States, influencing their responses in future interactions.

When the U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, they did not receive the warm welcome they had anticipated from the skeptical Iraqi Shia population. The scars from the uprising of 1991 and the perceived abandonment still ran deep, and the population remained reluctant to rise against Saddam until Baghdad fell. The seeds of mistrust sown in 1991 had come to fruition, making the 2003 invasion far more challenging than it might otherwise have been.

An Apology Too Little, Too Late

In 2011, twenty years after the failed uprising, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, James F. Jeffrey, officially apologized to Iraqi politicians and southern tribal leaders for the U.S. inaction in 1991. However, the apology was met with mixed reactions. For many, the apology felt like too little, too late.

Adel Abdul Mahdi, a top Iraqi Shia political leader, commented: “At the least, from what we are facing now, this would have been a much better solution than the solution of 2003. The role of Iraq’s people would have been fundamental, not like in 2003.”

On the other hand, a spokesman for a top Shia religious leader, Ayatollah Basheer Hussain Najafi, stated that “the apology of the U.S. has come too late, and does not change what happened. The apology is not going to bring back to the widows their husbands, and bereaved mothers their sons and brothers that they lost in the massacre that followed the uprising.”

This goes to show the deep wounds that the 1991 uprising and its aftermath left on the Iraqi people. An apology, no matter how sincere, could not undo the past and the damage it had caused.

Conclusion: Lessons from History and Moving Forward

The series of events during and after the 1991 uprising in Iraq present critical lessons for foreign policy makers. Chief among them is the undeniable power of perception and the crucial role it plays in shaping the dynamics of international relationships.

The U.S.’ perceived abandonment of the 1991 uprising cast a long, ominous shadow over future U.S.-Iraq relations. It sowed seeds of mistrust and skepticism among the Iraqi population that manifested later during the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Despite the ousting of Saddam Hussein, the United States was met with wariness rather than the anticipated joyous welcome.

Moreover, the diplomatic maneuvers in the aftermath of the uprising, such as the denial of aid to the rebels and the refusal to support their cause, further cemented the perception of U.S. indifference towards the plight of the Iraqi people. These perceptions have had long-term consequences, affecting not just the 2003 invasion, but arguably the current state of affairs in Iraq as well.

Thus, it becomes clear that foreign policy is not merely about diplomatic and military decisions, but also about managing perceptions. The inability to address these perceptions can have far-reaching impacts, many of which can reverberate decades later.

The events of 1991 also underscore the importance of clear communication in foreign policy. The ambiguity and conflicting messages from the U.S. regarding its position on the uprising created confusion, which contributed to the eventual downfall of the rebellion. Ensuring clear and consistent messaging can prevent such misinterpretations and the devastating consequences they can bring.

As we look to the future, we must remember these lessons. Acknowledging past mistakes is a crucial first step, but the road to reconciliation and building trust is a long one. The U.S. apology in 2011 was a start, but more needs to be done to bridge the gap between the United States and Iraq, a divide that can be traced back to the 1991 uprising.

In the end, the history of the 1991 uprising in Iraq serves as a powerful reminder of the human cost of political decisions. It’s a testament to the importance of fostering and maintaining trust in international relations. The cost of failing to do so, as we’ve seen, can be devastatingly high. As we move forward, let’s strive to remember these lessons and apply them in our future dealings, in the hope of creating a more peaceful and understanding world.