The Looming Breakdown of the Russia-Iran Alliance
The partnership between Russia and Iran is a captivating dance of geopolitical interests, where pragmatism often overrides ideological harmony, and the constant interplay between cooperation and competition shapes the contour of their bilateral relations. Nicole Grajewski’s incisive research lays bare the complex dynamics of this alliance, revealing a relationship that is anything but linear. As we delve into the insights offered by Grajewski, it becomes evident that the Russia-Iran nexus is defined by a convergence of interests in security, energy, economics, and diplomacy, albeit these commonalities are frequently punctuated by diverging national ambitions and regional strategies. The contemporary entente between the two countries dates back to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when they began to cooperate on nuclear, defense, and trade issues. However, their partnership has also faced challenges and tensions, such as Russia’s balancing acts with other regional actors, Iran’s dissatisfaction with Moscow’s arms sales and sanctions policies, and their differing views on the Syrian conflict and the Caspian Sea dispute. Despite these frictions, Russia and Iran have maintained a strategic alliance that serves their mutual interests and challenges the U.S.-led order in the Middle East and beyond.
The security aspect of the Russia-Iran partnership is arguably the most salient, born out of a shared desire to counter mutual threats. Their alignment in Syria is emblematic of their synchrony, with both nations propping up the Assad regime, forming a bulwark against both extremist groups and perceived U.S. interventionism. Yet, even within this realm of seeming cooperation, discord simmers beneath the surface. Russia’s balancing acts — selling subpar military equipment to Iran or its dalliance with international sanctions— signal a partnership that is as much about keeping Iran in check as it is about collaboration. Furthermore, their diverging visions for Syria’s future underscore a fundamental misalignment in strategic endgames: Russia eyes a secular reconstruction of Syrian statehood, whereas Iran’s intentions seem more deeply enmeshed with sectarian and ideological outcomes, such as supporting Hezbollah and other Shia militias. Additionally, Russia and Iran have different approaches to the regional balance of power, especially regarding Israel, which Russia maintains diplomatic ties with, while Iran considers it an enemy.
In the energy sector, the entente between the two nations is driven by their roles as major global oil and gas suppliers. The formation of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in 2001 is a testament to their ability to synchronize strategies for mutual benefit. The GECF is an intergovernmental organization of 19 member countries that together hold more than 70% of the world’s natural gas reserves. However, the energy alliance is fraught with complications. Sanctions, global market fluctuations, and alternative pipeline projects threaten the stability of this union. For instance, the U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas sector have hampered its exports and investments. The energy landscape is a chessboard where their cooperative moves are continuously threatened by global shifts and competing interests, such as the growing demand for renewable energy and the rivalry with other gas producers.
When we turn to economics, the veneer of the partnership begins to show cracks. Trade and investment have not reached their potential, stifled by sanctions and infrastructural inadequacies. Economic interactions are hostage to a larger geopolitical game where strategic considerations triumph over commercial interests. The underwhelming economic exchange reflects a broader reality: Russia and Iran are partners of convenience rather than conviction, their economic entanglement limited by systemic incompatibilities and external pressures. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, the bilateral trade between Russia and Iran was only $2.08 billion in 2019, a fraction of their respective total trade volumes. The main products traded were metals, chemicals, and machinery. The trade was also imbalanced, with Russia exporting more than three times as much as Iran. Despite the signing of a free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Russia is a member, in 2018, the trade barriers and sanctions remain formidable obstacles for enhancing economic cooperation.
Diplomatically, Russia and Iran engage in a delicate tango, sometimes in step, other times out of sync. Their joint efforts in the Astana Process and mutual support in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA exhibit a united front. However, differing regional interests, especially in the volatile terrain of the South Caucasus and their disparate policies towards Israel, illuminate a complex, multifaceted diplomatic relationship where alliance is perpetually weighed against national advantage. For instance, Russia has tried to mediate between Iran and Israel over their clashes in Syria, while also maintaining ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s rival. Iran, on the other hand, has accused Russia of betraying its interests by cooperating with the U.S. and Israel on some issues, such as the extension of the UN arms embargo on Iran. Moreover, Russia and Iran have divergent views on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Russia supports the status quo and Iran favors the rights of Azerbaijan.
Grajewski’s thorough analysis paints a picture of a partnership that is neither wholly strategic nor purely tactical but rather one that exists in a grey zone of geopolitical engagement. It’s a partnership characterized by the art of the possible, where mutual interests are pursued with an eye toward the opportunistic and where the specter of competition looms as large as the incentive for cooperation.
As we project into the future, it is clear that the trajectory of the Russia-Iran partnership will be shaped by a myriad of factors — from shifts in U.S. foreign policy to regional upheavals and internal political evolutions. The inherent volatility within this alliance suggests that it will continue to be reactive, adapting to the changing contours of global politics. It is an alliance built not on a bedrock of shared values but on a strategic quicksand that could shift with the geopolitical winds. For instance, the outcome of the Iranian presidential election in June 2021, which resulted in the victory of the hardline conservative Ebrahim Raisi, could affect the prospects of reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear deal that Russia supports. Moreover, the potential succession of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is 82 years old and reportedly in poor health, could also alter the balance of power and influence in Iran’s political system. Additionally, the regional dynamics in the Middle East and the South Caucasus, where Russia and Iran have both common and divergent interests, could pose challenges or opportunities for their partnership.
