The Littoral Combat Ship: A Flawed and Failed Experiment
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a type of US Navy warship that was designed to operate in shallow waters and perform various missions such as anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and surface warfare. The LCS program was launched in 2002 with the aim of creating a fast, agile, and stealthy vessel that could adapt to different threats and scenarios in the littorals, the areas near the shore where most naval operations take place. However, the LCS program has been plagued by cost overruns, delays, technical issues, and criticism from experts and lawmakers, who have questioned its effectiveness, reliability, and survivability. The LCS is a failed experiment that has not delivered on its promises and has left the US Navy with a fleet of expensive and unreliable ships that are not suitable for high-intensity combat. The LCS program is now undergoing a redesign and a rebranding as the Constellation-class frigate, a more capable and survivable ship that will replace some of the LCSs in service.
The LCS program was conceived as a response to the changing nature of naval warfare in the post-Cold War era, where the US Navy faced new challenges from asymmetric and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats, such as small boats, mines, submarines, and missiles, that could deny or limit its access to coastal regions. The LCS was supposed to be a modular and flexible platform that could accommodate different mission modules, such as sensors, weapons, and unmanned vehicles, depending on the task at hand. The LCS was also supposed to be cheaper and easier to build and maintain than traditional warships, such as destroyers and frigates, and to complement them in the naval force structure. The LCS program envisioned two different variants of the ship, the Freedom-class and the Independence-class, each built by a different contractor and with a different hull design, propulsion system, and mission module interface. The US Navy planned to acquire 55 LCSs, with an initial cost estimate of $220 million per ship.
However, the LCS program soon encountered a series of problems that undermined its viability and credibility. The cost of the LCS increased significantly, reaching an average of $584 million per ship as of 2020, and exceeding the congressional cost cap of $480 million per ship. The delivery of the LCS was also delayed by several years, with the first ship, USS Freedom (LCS-1), commissioned in 2008, six years after the contract award. The LCS also suffered from numerous technical and operational issues, such as hull cracks, corrosion, engine failures, electrical malfunctions, and software glitches, that reduced its availability and performance. The LCS also faced challenges in integrating and testing its mission modules, which were not ready or compatible with the ships, and in developing and deploying its unmanned vehicles, which were essential for its missions. The LCS also proved to be vulnerable to cyberattacks, as demonstrated by a hacking incident in 2016 that compromised its network and forced it to return to port.
The LCS also faced criticism from various sources, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and several retired naval officers and analysts, who questioned its effectiveness, reliability, and survivability in combat. The critics argued that the LCS was not able to perform its intended missions, such as anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and surface warfare, due to its inadequate sensors, weapons, and protection. The critics also argued that the LCS was not able to operate in contested environments, such as the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, where it would face sophisticated threats from adversaries such as China, Iran, and the Houthi rebels, who possess advanced anti-ship missiles, submarines, mines, and drones. The critics also argued that the LCS was not able to operate independently or as part of a larger naval force, due to its limited range, endurance, and compatibility with other warships. The critics also argued that the LCS was not worth the investment, given its high cost, low availability, and marginal contribution to the naval missions.
The US Navy, in response to the problems and criticisms of the LCS program, initiated a series of changes and reforms to improve the performance and viability of the LCS. The US Navy reduced the number of LCSs to be acquired from 55 to 35, and decided to downselect to one variant by 2019. The US Navy also modified the design and configuration of the LCS, adding more weapons, such as over-the-horizon anti-ship missiles, and more protection, such as improved electronic warfare systems and decoys. The US Navy also revised the concept of operations and the crewing model of the LCS, increasing the number of sailors onboard, rotating the crews between the ships, and assigning the ships to dedicated mission areas. The US Navy also renamed the LCS as the Fast Frigate (FF), and reclassified it as a frigate, rather than a combatant, to reflect its role and capabilities.
However, these changes and reforms were not enough to salvage the LCS program, which was still plagued by unresolved issues and persistent criticism. The US Navy, in 2020, announced a new plan to replace some of the LCSs with a new class of multi-mission guided-missile frigates, the Constellation-class (FFG-62), which are based on the European multipurpose frigates (FREMM) already in service with the French and Italian navies. The Constellation-class frigates are intended to be more capable and survivable than the LCS, and to perform the same missions, such as anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and electronic warfare, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. The Constellation-class frigates will also be compatible with the Aegis combat system, the Cooperative Engagement Capability, and the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air network, which will enable them to operate with other warships and aircraft in a high-intensity combat scenario. The US Navy plans to acquire 20 Constellation-class frigates, with the first one expected to be delivered in 2026.
The reason why the LCS is not in the Red Sea is because the LCS is not fit for the current crisis that is unfolding in the region, where Yemen’s Houthi rebels are attacking commercial shipping and threatening global trade.
The LCS is not equipped to deal with the sophisticated threats posed by the Houthis, such as drones, missiles, and mines, and would be vulnerable to attacks from the air, sea, and land. The LCS lacks the sensors, weapons, and protection to detect, engage, and defeat the Houthi threats, and to defend itself and other ships from them. The LCS also lacks the range, endurance, and compatibility to operate in the Red Sea, which is a narrow and congested waterway that requires constant vigilance and coordination with other naval forces. The LCS is therefore not a useful asset for the US Navy in the Red Sea, and has been left behind in favor of more robust and reliable warships that can handle the complex and dangerous situation.
The US Navy, along with its allies and partners, has deployed a naval coalition to protect the Red Sea shipping lanes, which are vital for global trade and energy security. The naval coalition includes aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and submarines that have more firepower and endurance than the LCS, and that can operate in contested environments. The naval coalition also includes the Constellation-class frigates, which are expected to join the fleet in the near future, and which will provide a more capable and survivable alternative to the LCS. The Constellation-class frigates will be able to perform the same missions as the LCS, but with more effectiveness, reliability, and survivability, and with more compatibility with other warships and aircraft. The Constellation-class frigates will also be able to operate in the Red Sea, and to counter the Houthi threats, as well as other potential adversaries, such as Iran, China, and Russia, that may seek to challenge the US and its allies in the region.
Conclusion
The LCS is a flawed and failed experiment that has not delivered on its promises and has left the US Navy with a fleet of expensive and unreliable ships that are not suitable for high-intensity combat. The LCS is not fit for the current crisis in the Red Sea, where the Houthi rebels are attacking commercial shipping and threatening global trade. The LCS is not equipped to deal with the sophisticated threats posed by the Houthis, and would be vulnerable to attacks from the air, sea, and land.
