The Freedom-class LCS: A costly and controversial experiment in naval technology

The U.S. Navy’s decision to decommission nine of its Freedom-class littoral combat ships (LCS) is a significant strategic pivot that reveals as much about the changing nature of naval warfare as it does about the pitfalls of defense procurement and military innovation. These sleek, futuristic ships, once the darlings of defense transformation advocates, are being retired early — and it’s worth exploring why. Some of the reasons for this decision include:

• Propulsion issues: The Freedom-class LCS have a complex combining gear that transfers power from the ship’s engines to its water jets, allowing it to reach speeds of over 40 knots. However, this system has been prone to frequent breakdowns and costly repairs, affecting the ships’ availability and readiness.
• Modular concept failure: The Freedom-class LCS were designed to be rapidly reconfigured with different mission packages for surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare. However, the plug-and-play concept did not work as expected, and the ships often faced delays, technical glitches, and compatibility problems with the modules.
• Mission package cancellation: The Freedom-class LCS were supposed to take on the anti-submarine warfare mission with a variable depth sonar that could detect and track enemy submarines in shallow waters. However, the Navy canceled this mission package in 2022, citing poor performance and stability issues with the sonar. This left the ships with only one viable mission package — surface warfare.
• Opportunity cost: The Navy estimated that decommissioning the nine Freedom-class LCS would save $1.8 billion in operating and maintenance costs, which could be reinvested in other more capable and lethal platforms, such as the Constellation-class frigates. The frigates are expected to have enhanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities and a more traditional multi-mission stance, filling the gap left by the LCS.

Launched in 2001, the LCS program was an ambitious leap toward a new generation of naval capability. These vessels were envisioned as the maritime Swiss Army knives — fast, versatile, and relatively inexpensive. They were to glide through shallow waters with agility, equipped for anything from hunting submarines to sweeping for mines, to engaging in surface combat. However, the program faced many challenges and criticisms, such as cost overruns, delays, technical problems, and operational failures. The Navy planned to acquire 55 LCSs, but later reduced the number to 35 and decided to retire nine of them early. The Navy also developed a new class of frigates, called the Constellation class, to replace some of the LCSs and provide more robust multi-mission capabilities. The LCS program has been a controversial and costly experiment in naval innovation, with mixed results and uncertain future.

The propulsion issues that plagued the Freedom class are a stark reminder of the technological hubris that can sometimes cloud military judgement. It’s one thing to push the envelope; it’s quite another to rely on systems that haven’t been proven robust across the operational spectrum. A combined diesel and gas turbine system powering four water jets made these ships among the fastest in the Navy, but their speed came at a high price — frequent breakdowns and costly repairs. The Navy has identified a material defect in the combining gear, a complex transmission that connects the engines to the water jets, and has halted the deliveries of new Freedom-class ships until a fix is found. The problem affects 13 ships in service and requires a complicated and lengthy retrofit that could take years to complete. The Navy has also restricted the ships to using either the diesel engines or the gas turbines, but not both, limiting their top speed to 12 knots.

The modular concept, initially hailed as revolutionary, promised that these ships could be rapidly reconfigured with different mission packages. The reality was different; the plug-and-play dream failed to materialize in a practical, reliable form. It’s a cautionary tale about the allure of high-tech flexibility versus the gritty realities of military logistics and operations. Some of the challenges that the LCS faced with its modular concept include:

• High maintenance costs: The LCS required frequent and expensive maintenance for its propulsion system, which was prone to breakdowns and failures. The Navy also had to invest in additional infrastructure and personnel to support the module swapping process.
• Poor performance: The LCS mission modules did not meet the operational requirements or expectations for their intended missions. The anti-submarine warfare module was canceled due to technical and stability issues, while the mine countermeasures module was delayed and dependent on unproven technologies.
• Lack of versatility: The LCS mission modules were not interchangeable across the two variants of the ship, the Freedom and the Independence class. This limited the flexibility and availability of the modules for different operational scenarios. Moreover, the LCS could not carry more than one mission module at a time, reducing its multi-mission capability.

And then there were the mission packages themselves. Of the three types — surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare — only the surface package delivered as expected. The surface package consists of a 30 mm gun, a 57 mm gun, and a surface-to-surface missile module that can fire Hellfire missiles. The mine countermeasure package, dependent on a suite of still-developing technologies, was not ready for prime time. The mine package includes unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, towed sonars, and a helicopter with mine-detection sensors. The anti-submarine package fared even worse, plagued by poor performance and stability issues until it was ultimately canceled. The anti-submarine package was supposed to have a variable-depth sonar, a towed array sonar, and a helicopter with torpedoes. However, the Navy found that the LCS was too noisy and vulnerable to operate effectively in the anti-submarine role.

This is where the narrative of the LCS class takes on a somber tone. It’s a story of a vision that couldn’t meet reality. The ships failed to deliver on their multi-mission promise and ended up as expensive, single-mission vessels with a poor operational track record. Moreover, they couldn’t fill the capability gap left by the retiring older ships. It’s a painful admission that, despite the investment and the initial hopes, the Navy had taken a wrong turn.

But there’s a silver lining in the form of the Constellation-class frigates, poised to succeed where the LCS could not. With enhanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities and a more traditional multi-mission stance, these new ships seem set to become the reliable workhorses the Navy needs. The Constellation-class frigates are based on the European FREMM design, which is already in service with the French and Italian navies. They will feature the Aegis Baseline 10 combat system, the SPY-6 radar, and 32 vertical launch system cells for Tomahawk, ESSM, and SM-2 missiles. They will also carry an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and an MQ-8C Firescout drone for aerial reconnaissance and strike3. The Navy plans to acquire 20 Constellation-class frigates, with the first one, USS Constellation, expected to be delivered in 2026.

The decision to build six more modified Freedom-class ships is a pragmatic compromise. It salvages something from the existing investment and provides a stopgap capability until the frigates are ready in numbers. The modified Freedom-class ships will have improved survivability, lethality, and reliability, as well as a reduced crew size and operating cost. They will also be equipped with a new combat management system, a 76 mm gun, a variable depth sonar, and an over-the-horizon missile. Meanwhile, the Independence-class LCS variant, spared the decommissioning axe, will carry on the mine countermeasure mission, hopefully with better success. The Independence-class ships have a larger flight deck and more internal space than the Freedom-class, which allows them to carry more mine countermeasure equipment and unmanned vehicles. They also have fewer propulsion issues and a lower maintenance cost than the Freedom-class.

The LCS program’s failures illustrate the challenges and risks of innovation in defense technology. The program faced cost overruns, delays, and unmet expectations, as well as technical and operational problems. It also shows the importance of rigorous, realistic testing and evaluation of new technologies before deploying them in the field. According to a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Navy did not adequately test the LCS’s performance, reliability, and survivability, and accepted ships with numerous defects and deficiencies. The program also demonstrates the need to balance enthusiasm for new technologies with a hard-nosed assessment of their practicality and suitability for the mission. The LCS was designed to be a multi-mission platform, but it turned out to be a single-mission vessel with limited capabilities and vulnerabilities. The Navy had to revise its operational concepts and requirements several times to accommodate the LCS’s shortcomings. The program also reveals the need for adaptability and flexibility in procurement strategies, as the Navy had to change course and pursue a more conventional frigate design to replace the LCS.