Submerged Strategy: How AUKUS’ Advanced Submarine Capabilities Counter China’s A2/AD Ambitions

The AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) alliance represents a strategic shift in naval power dynamics, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. This alliance aims to counterbalance Chinese military assertiveness, especially in the realm of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). One of the pivotal elements of this alliance is the enhancement of submarine capabilities, which plays a crucial role in asymmetric warfare strategies against potential adversaries, like China.

Asymmetric Advantage through Advanced Submarine Capabilities

Technological and Operational Superiority: The AUKUS alliance, through initiatives like the Submarine Rotational Forces-West (SRF-West), is enhancing its capabilities in various advanced technologies, including anti-submarine warfare, quantum computing, directed-energy weapons, and missile defenses. These advancements provide an asymmetric advantage over China, whose People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is perceived to have weaknesses in anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

Nuclear Submarine Agreement: The AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Agreement is specifically tailored to bolster the anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capabilities of its members. This involves equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), which are seen as a direct response to Chinese efforts to enhance its A2/AD capabilities, aimed at deterring U.S. intervention in regional conflicts.

Enhanced Deterrence and Operational Range: The introduction of advanced warfighting platforms, particularly nuclear-powered submarines, in the AUKUS framework significantly enhances the undersea deterrence against China. These submarines, with their extended range and superior systems, pose a strategic challenge to China’s maritime logistics and operational planning.

Countering Chinese A2/AD Strategy

China’s A2/AD strategy is designed to prevent adversaries, particularly the United States, from intervening in regional conflicts or disputes. This strategy relies heavily on a combination of missile systems, advanced radar, and other electronic warfare capabilities to create a defensive perimeter, making it challenging for opposing forces to penetrate or operate within these zones. The AUKUS alliance’s focus on advanced submarine technology and warfare capabilities is a direct counter to this strategy. By enhancing their undersea warfare capabilities, AUKUS members aim to create conditions where their naval forces can operate effectively, even within Chinese A2/AD zones, thus negating some of the strategic advantages China seeks through its A2/AD capabilities.

Key features of China’s A2/AD strategy:

• The use of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) to target enemy ships and aircraft carriers at long ranges. China’s DF-21D and DF-26 ASBMs are known as “carrier killers” because they can potentially strike moving targets at distances up to 1,500 km and 4,000 km respectively. China’s YJ-100, YJ-12, and YJ-18 ASCMs are also capable of supersonic speeds and high maneuverability, making them difficult to intercept.
• The use of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and ballistic missiles to strike enemy bases and facilities on land. China’s CJ-10 and DH-10 LACMs have ranges of over 1,500 km and can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. China’s DF-15, DF-16, and DF-31 ballistic missiles can also target key locations in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Guam.
• The use of advanced radar and electronic warfare systems to detect, track, jam, and deceive enemy sensors and communications. China’s JY-27, JY-26, and JY-14 radars are designed to counter stealth aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles by using very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF) bands2. China’s EW-1, EW-2, and EW-3 electronic warfare aircraft can also disrupt enemy radar and electronic systems by emitting powerful jamming signals or false targets.

Key features of the AUKUS alliance’s submarine technology and warfare capabilities:

• The use of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to conduct stealthy and sustained operations in the Indo-Pacific region. SSNs have advantages over conventional diesel-electric submarines in terms of speed, endurance, and power generation. SSNs can also carry a variety of weapons, such as torpedoes, missiles, and mines, to engage enemy surface ships, submarines, and land targets.
• The use of advanced sonar and acoustic systems to detect, track, and evade enemy submarines and surface ships. SSNs are equipped with sophisticated sonar arrays and towed arrays that can provide passive and active detection of underwater threats. SSNs can also employ countermeasures, such as decoys and noise makers, to confuse enemy sonar and acoustic systems.
• The use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to collect and share information on enemy activities and movements. SSNs can perform covert ISR missions by using sensors, cameras, and antennas to gather data on enemy forces and facilities. SSNs can also communicate with other friendly platforms, such as satellites, aircraft, and ships, to exchange information and coordinate actions.

Strategic Implications

The strategic implications of the AUKUS alliance’s focus on submarine warfare are significant:

• Shift in Naval Power Balance: The introduction of advanced submarine capabilities into the Indo-Pacific region by AUKUS could shift the naval power balance, challenging China’s growing maritime assertiveness. China has been expanding its submarine fleet and developing new technologies such as ballistic missile submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles. AUKUS aims to counter this threat by providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines that have greater stealth, speed, endurance, and firepower than conventional ones.
• Operational Flexibility: Enhanced submarine capabilities provide AUKUS members with greater operational flexibility and the ability to conduct a range of missions from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to direct combat operations. Submarines can operate in contested waters, access denied areas, and sensitive regions without being detected or challenged by surface or air forces. They can also deliver precision strikes, deploy special forces, support amphibious operations, and protect sea lines of communication.
• Deterrence Posture: By bolstering their undersea warfare capabilities, AUKUS members enhance their deterrence posture in the region, potentially deterring aggressive actions or territorial expansions by adversaries. Submarines are a key element of strategic deterrence, as they can carry nuclear weapons and pose a credible second-strike threat. AUKUS will also enhance conventional deterrence, as submarines can demonstrate presence, signal resolve, and impose costs on adversaries in a crisis or conflict. AUKUS will strengthen the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific, as well as the rules-based international order, by deterring coercion and aggression from any state or non-state actor.

Conclusion

In summary, the AUKUS alliance, through its focus on advanced submarine capabilities, is strategically positioning itself to counterbalance China’s A2/AD strategy in the Indo-Pacific. This move represents a significant shift in naval power dynamics, enhancing the asymmetric advantage of AUKUS members in the region and potentially altering the strategic calculus of regional powers, including China.