Shifting Sands: The UAE-China Military Alliance and Its Impact on Regional and Global Power Dynamics

The UAE-China military partnership, especially in the context of the Falcon Shield 2023 exercise, is a multifaceted development with significant implications for regional dynamics and global geopolitical balances. This exercise, which marks the first joint military drill between China and the UAE, is seen by many analysts as a signal to the United States, highlighting the UAE’s exploration of security options beyond its traditional alliance with the U.S. The Falcon Shield 2023 military drill aims to strengthen pragmatic exchanges and cooperation between the Chinese and UAE air forces while fostering mutual understanding and trust. The exercise has been held in China’s Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, which has been a preferred venue for joint military exercises in the past. The UAE’s involvement in the exercise reflects its interest in diversifying its defense arsenal by incorporating Chinese-made weaponry, such as drones and advanced trainer jets. The UAE’s collaboration with China in military exercises and arms deals indicates a shift in the regional geopolitical landscape and challenges the traditional regional security architecture.

The backdrop to this shift includes a series of events and perceptions that have shaped Gulf states’ attitudes towards the U.S. and led them to seek alternative partnerships. The Obama administration’s perceived softening commitment to Gulf security, especially following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, and Trump’s administration characterized by rhetoric rather than strategic engagement in the region, have contributed to a sense of uncertainty among Gulf states about the reliability of the U.S. as a security partner. This uncertainty has been further compounded by the U.S. response to Iranian attacks in the region and has encouraged Gulf states to become more self-sufficient and explore extra-regional partnerships, with China emerging as a key player.

But other events has led to this loss of trust of the golf monarchy toward the United States security guarantees:

• The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath: The involvement of fifteen Saudi nationals in the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was opposed by most Gulf states, strained the U.S.-Gulf relations and raised questions about the U.S. role and intentions in the region.
• The 2015 Iran nuclear deal: The U.S.-led negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and the resulting Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 were seen by many Gulf states as a betrayal of their interests and a sign of the U.S. appeasement of their regional rival. The Gulf states feared that the deal would embolden Iran to pursue its destabilizing activities in the region and undermine their security.
• The 2017 Qatar crisis: The diplomatic and economic blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt on Qatar in 2017 over its alleged support for terrorism and ties with Iran exposed the divisions and rivalries among the Gulf states and their lack of trust in the U.S. mediation. The U.S. initially sided with the blockading states, but later adopted a more balanced approach and called for dialogue and de-escalation.
• The 2020 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan: The U.S. decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 2020 and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government and the takeover by the Taliban were seen by many Gulf states as a failure of the U.S. leadership and a demonstration of its unreliability as a security partner. The Gulf states also worried about the implications of the withdrawal for the regional stability and the resurgence of terrorism.

China’s increasing influence in the Gulf region is not limited to military aspects. The Gulf states, and the UAE in particular, view China as an increasingly important global player, especially in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This initiative aims to create a network of trade routes with China at its center, offering significant economic opportunities for Gulf countries looking to diversify their economies. The UAE’s strategic location and its developments in key maritime areas like the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea make it a crucial partner for China in its regional ambitions. This partnership is manifested by:

• The Khalifa Port: The UAE’s largest port, located in Abu Dhabi, is home to the China-UAE Industrial Capacity Cooperation Demonstration Zone, which hosts several Chinese companies operating in various sectors, such as energy, logistics, trade, and manufacturing. The port also serves as a hub for China’s maritime silk road, connecting China with Africa and Europe.
• The Dubai Silk Road Strategy: Launched in 2019, this strategy aims to enhance Dubai’s role as a regional and global trade center, by developing its infrastructure, logistics, and customs services. The strategy involves cooperation with China on several projects, such as the Dubai Tram, the Expo 2020 Dubai, and the e-commerce platform Noon.
• The 5G Network: The UAE is one of the first countries in the world to launch the 5G network, with the help of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei. The 5G network enables faster and more reliable data transmission, which supports the UAE’s vision of becoming a smart city and a leader in innovation and technology.

The broader implications of China’s expanding role in the Gulf, including in military-security affairs, have raised concerns in the U.S. This expansion encompasses arms sales, military exercises, and potential military or intelligence-gathering installations. The revelation of China’s construction of a military facility in the UAE, despite being halted after U.S. pressure, exemplifies these growing ties and the consequent concerns from the U.S:

• The location and purpose of the facility: The suspected Chinese military facility was located inside a container terminal at Khalifa Port, near Abu Dhabi, which is operated by a Chinese shipping corporation, Cosco. The facility was reportedly intended to host Chinese personnel, equipment, and vehicles, and possibly serve as a base for intelligence-gathering and surveillance operations in the region.
• The US intervention and response: The US intelligence agencies detected the construction work on the facility in early 2021 and alerted the UAE authorities, who claimed to be unaware of the Chinese activities. The US officials held several talks with the UAE leaders, including two direct conversations between President Biden and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, to urge them to stop the project. The UAE reportedly agreed to halt the construction and allowed the US officials to inspect the site in late 2021.

China’s approach in the Gulf has been marked by its policy of non-alliance, focusing on economic and technological cooperation while avoiding becoming entangled in defense commitments. This strategy allows China to maintain balanced relations with various Middle Eastern countries, including those with conflicting interests, such as Iran and the Gulf states. However, China’s increasing military exports to the region, although still small compared to traditional sources, indicate a growing interest in strengthening military relationships in the Gulf:

• Drones: China has emerged as a major supplier of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have used them for surveillance and combat operations in Yemen and Libya. China’s drones, such as the Wing Loong and the CH-4, are cheaper and less restricted by export controls than their Western counterparts, making them attractive for the Gulf customers.
• Missiles: China has also sold various types of missiles to the Gulf states, such as anti-ship missiles, anti-tank missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. For instance, Saudi Arabia has acquired the C-802 anti-ship missile and the HJ-8 anti-tank missile from China, while the UAE has purchased the FN-6 man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) and the LY-80 medium-range surface-to-air missile system from China.
• Trainer jets: China has also exported advanced trainer jets to the Gulf states, such as the L-15 Falcon and the K-8 Karakorum, which can also perform light attack roles. The UAE has ordered 24 L-15 jets from China, while Oman has ordered 12 K-8 jets from China. These jets can help the Gulf states enhance their air force capabilities and train their pilots.

In summary, the UAE-China military partnership represents a significant strategic shift in the Middle East, driven by regional uncertainties, economic opportunities, and shared interests in technology and security domains. This partnership challenges the traditional regional security architecture and reflects the complexities of the evolving global geopolitical landscape.