Russia’s Su-57 Felon: A Stealth Fighter or a Mirage? An In-Depth Analysis of Ambitions, Shortcomings, and Realities

The Su-57, codenamed Felon by NATO, is a subject of intrigue, skepticism, and debate among military analysts and enthusiasts. As Russia’s touted fifth-generation stealth fighter, it has been presented as a technological marvel, but the reality seems to be quite different. Here’s an in-depth look at the Su-57, its capabilities, shortcomings, and the reasons behind Russia’s reluctance to deploy it in Ukraine.

The Hype and the Reality

The Su-57 began development in the early 2000s, with the intention of being Russia’s entry into the fifth-generation fighter category. It was designed to be an evolution of the previous Soviet Union’s Su-27 shape, adapted for low visibility and supersonic speed and agility. However, numerous problems with its design have caused equally numerous delays.

The original concept for the Su-57 was for the plane to use newly designed and more powerful Isdeli 30 engines. However, nearly all the prototypes and production models released so far are equipped with the same engine used on the existing Su-35s, the AL-41 engine. This engine, which is effectively a 50-year-old design, has been plagued with reliability and quality control issues.

The Su-57’s engine problems are not the only concern. The aircraft has been burdened with inadequate and incomplete sensors, fire control systems, self-protection suites, and unreliable engines. Despite its impressive maneuverability and eye-catching paint schemes, the aircraft falls short in many vital areas, including less than stellar stealth capabilities.

Stealth Capabilities: A Critical Shortcoming

In the realm of stealth capability, the Su-57 has been heavily criticized. It falls far short of its U.S counterparts, the F-22 and F-35. The primary means of reducing radar visibility is to carry normally wing or belly-mounted munitions in the interior of the plane. However, the Su-57’s design has several flaws that increase its radar cross-section (RCS).

The Su-57 employs radar blockers to reduce reflections from the engine inlet guide vanes, but they don’t do enough to remove that radar return. The entire plane isn’t coated in radar absorbent materials, unlike the F-22 and F-35. The Su-57 also has exposed rivets all across the plane, especially on its wings, which dramatically increase the plane’s radar signature.

The manufacturer, Sukhoi, claims the Su-57 has an optimal radar cross-section between 0.1 to 1 square meters. In comparison, the F-35 has an RCS of 0.05, and the F-22 has an RCS of 0.01. This makes the Su-57’s RCS 1,000 to 10,000 times larger than the U.S. counterparts.

Reluctance to Deploy in Ukraine

The question arises: if the Russians are so positive about the Su-57, why are they so reluctant to use it in the current invasion of Ukraine? The answer is multifaceted.

First, Russia doesn’t want to risk having the Su-57 captured and thereby having its true RCS revealed by the West. The risk of exposure of any other advanced capabilities or lack thereof is a significant concern.

Second, Ukraine has done a remarkable job of shooting down Russian aircraft. As of March 2023, Ukraine had shot down 70 Russian fighter aircraft. The risk of having the Su-57 shot down is a real and present danger.

Third, there just aren’t very many Su-57s available for the Russian Air Force. The best estimates suggest that Russia has only received somewhere between 5 and 15 of the aircraft. These numbers pale in comparison to the number of F-22 Raptors and F-35 Lightnings that the U.S currently has flying.

International Market and Future Prospects

The Su-57’s shortcomings have also affected its prospects in the international market. India, one of its original allies in the program, walked away from the project after years of delays and concerns about the aircraft’s engineering and reliability. Algeria’s contract to acquire Su-57s in 2025 may also fall through.

China has said no to the Su-57 and is developing its own 5th gen stealth fighter, the J-20 Super Dragon. Russia’s failed export sale of existing Su-35 planes to Iran further sends a negative signal to potential buyers of Russian armaments.

Conclusion

The Su-57 Felon is a troubled aircraft and a poor stealth fighter. Its comparatively poor RCS, unreliable engines, small production numbers, and reliance on outdated technology make it not really even comparable to the current best stealth aircraft.

Russian President Vladimir Putin may claim that the Felon is the best stealth fighter in the world, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The true reason why Russia can’t afford to have one of their few Su-57s shot down is that if the West were to discover that this plane is nothing more than a souped-up 4th gen fighter, its chances of ever being sold to overseas buyers would vanish.

The Su-57 is a symbol of Russia’s ambition to lead in military aviation, but it also represents a series of missed opportunities, technological shortcomings, and strategic miscalculations.