Russia’s conscription pause: a window of opportunity for Ukraine?
In a recent video interview, George Barros, a research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a US-based think tank that focuses on military and security issues, discussed the implications of Russia’s decision to pause its conscription process for the spring of 2024.
According to Barros, this means that Russia will not replenish its troops with fresh recruits until the fall, leaving its forces understaffed and overstretched in the ongoing war in Ukraine. He argues that this decision is a sign of weakness and vulnerability, as it indicates that Russia is facing a shortage of manpower, equipment, and supplies, and that its troops are exhausted and demoralized after more than a year of fighting.
He also suggests that this pause could create an opportunity for a counterattack by Ukraine and its allies, who could exploit Russia’s fatigue and overstretch, and inflict significant losses on its forces. He warns, however, that such a counterattack would be risky and costly, and that it would require a high level of coordination and support from the US and NATO, as well as a clear political and military strategy.
Barros adds that the war in Ukraine has broader implications for global security, as it challenges the international order and norms, and poses threats to regional stability, energy security, and nuclear proliferation. He concludes that the war in Ukraine is not a frozen conflict, but a dynamic and dangerous situation that requires constant attention and action from the international community.
Is Barros right in his analysis? What are the chances and challenges of a Ukrainian counterattack? How can the US and NATO help Ukraine in its struggle against Russian aggression? And what are the consequences of the war in Ukraine for the world?
Russia’s conscription dilemma
Russia has a mandatory 12-month draft for all male citizens who are between 18 and 30 years old, with a number of exceptions. Avoiding the draft is a felony under Russian criminal code and is punishable by up to 18 months of imprisonment. Conscripts are generally prohibited from being deployed abroad.
However, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Russia has been relying on a mix of regular troops, reservists, mercenaries, and local proxies to support its occupation of about 18% of Ukrainian territory.
These operations have put a strain on Russia’s military resources and personnel, especially as Ukraine has been resisting and retaliating with its own forces and weapons, including domestically-produced long-range drones. Russia has also faced international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and domestic protests over its involvement in the war.
In July 2023, Russia’s parliament voted to raise the maximum age of conscription to 30 from 27, increasing the number of young men liable for a year of compulsory military service. The law also prohibits conscripts from leaving the country once the enlistment office has sent them their draft notice. The law was supposed to come into force on 1 January 2024, but in December 2023, Russia announced that it would pause its conscription process for the spring of 2024, citing the need to improve the quality and efficiency of the draft.
Barros interprets this decision as a sign of Russia’s inability to sustain its military campaign in Ukraine, and as an admission of its failure to achieve its strategic objectives. He claims that Russia is facing a manpower crisis, as many young men are either evading or resisting the draft, or are unfit or unwilling to serve. He also says that Russia is running low on equipment and supplies, as it has been unable to replace or repair its losses, and as it has been cut off from international markets and partners. He further says that Russia’s troops are suffering from low morale, high casualties, and poor leadership, as they have been fighting a war that they do not understand or support.
Ukraine’s window of opportunity
Barros argues that Russia’s conscription pause could create a window of opportunity for Ukraine and its allies to launch a counterattack and regain some of the lost territory. He says that Ukraine has been preparing for such a scenario, by increasing its defence spending, modernizing its military, and developing its own weapons and capabilities.
He suggests that Ukraine could exploit Russia’s fatigue and overstretch, and inflict significant losses on its forces, by using its advantages in terrain, intelligence, and technology. He says that Ukraine could use its long-range drones, anti-tank missiles, and artillery to target Russia’s command and control, air defence, and logistics systems, as well as its troops and equipment. He also says that Ukraine could use its special forces, guerrilla fighters, and local allies to conduct sabotage, reconnaissance, and diversionary operations behind enemy lines. He also says that Ukraine could use its air force, navy, and cyber capabilities to disrupt Russia’s communications, navigation, and energy infrastructure.
He warns, however, that such a counterattack would be risky and costly, and that it would require a high level of coordination and support from the US and NATO, as well as a clear political and military strategy.
