More “Game Changers” (and Failures) in Ukraine — From Starlink & Electronic Warfare to Hypersonics
The ongoing war in Ukraine has been a testing ground for various weapons systems and technologies, some of which have been hyped up by the media or the military as “game changers” or “failures”. In this blog post, I will review some of these systems and assess their impact and effectiveness in the context of the conflict. I will also look at some of the less publicized but more significant systems that have shaped the battlefield.
System Shaping Battlefields
One of the main themes of the video by Perun is the importance of context and opportunity costs when evaluating the performance and utility of different systems. He argues that some of the systems that have been praised or criticized by the media or the military may not be as decisive or disappointing as they seem, depending on the situation and the trade-offs involved.
For example, he points out that the Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile, which has been touted as a “game changer” by Putin and the Russian media, has not been used effectively in the war. He explains that the Kinzhal is designed to penetrate advanced air defenses and strike high-value targets, but Ukraine does not have such defenses or targets. Moreover, the Kinzhal is launched from a modified MiG-31 fighter jet, which is vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses and requires a large and costly infrastructure to operate. Therefore, the Kinzhal is not a suitable weapon for the Ukrainian theater, and its use has been more of a political statement than a military necessity.
On the other hand, he praises the French SCALP cruise missile, which has been used by the UK and France to strike Russian targets in Ukraine. He notes that the SCALP is a stealthy and precise weapon that can hit targets from long ranges and avoid Russian air defenses. Therefore, the SCALP is a more cost-effective and adaptable weapon than the Kinzhal, and its use has been more of a military advantage than a political gesture.
The SCALP, also known as Storm Shadow in the UK, is a low-observable, long-range air-launched cruise missile developed since 1994 by Matra and British Aerospace, and now manufactured by MBDA. The missile weighs about 1,300 kilograms (2,900 lb), with a conventional warhead of 450 kilograms (990 lb). It has a maximum body diameter of 48 centimetres (19 in) and a wingspan of three metres (120 in). It is propelled at Mach 0.8 by a Microturbo TRI 60–30 turbojet engine and has range of approximately 560 km (300 nmi; 350 mi). The missile is based on the French-developed Apache anti-runway cruise missile, but differs in that it carries a unitary warhead instead of cluster munitions. The SCALP can be programmed before launch to follow a specific route and altitude, using GPS, inertial navigation system, infrared and terrain reference guidance systems. It can also identify and strike a pre-defined target using its high-resolution camera. Therefore, the SCALP is a more cost-effective and adaptable weapon than the Kinzhal, and its use has been more of a military advantage than a political gesture.
The Kinzhal, on the other hand, is a Russian hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile, likely derived from Russia’s ground-launched 9K720 Iskander-M. It has a reported range of 1,500–2,000 km (930–1,240 mi) and speed up to Mach 10. It can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads and can be launched by Tu-22M3 bombers or MiG-31K interceptors. It has been deployed at airbases in Russia’s Southern Military District and Western Military District . The Kinzhal entered service in December 2017 and was one of the six new Russian strategic weapons unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2018. The Kinzhal is designed to be able to hit NATO warships and missile defense systems, as well as land targets close to the Russian borders. However, the Kinzhal is not a true hypersonic weapon, as it does not use a scramjet engine or a glide vehicle, but rather a standard ballistic missile technology at greater speeds. The Kinzhal is also limited by the range and speed of its launching aircraft, and its accuracy and reliability are questionable . The Kinzhal is more of a political statement than a practical weapon, as Russia does not have a large number of these missiles and their use could escalate the conflict to a nuclear level.
TB-2 And Orlan
Another theme of the video is the role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the war, especially the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 and the Russian-made Orlan-10. He compares and contrasts these two drones and their impact on the conflict.
He argues that the TB-2, which has been widely praised by the Ukrainian and Western media as a “game changer”, has not been as effective as it was in other conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh war. He explains that the TB-2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone that can carry up to four guided missiles and conduct reconnaissance and strike missions. However, he notes that the TB-2 is vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare (EW) and air defenses, which can jam, spoof, or shoot down the drone. He also notes that the TB-2 is dependent on satellite communications, which can be disrupted or degraded by Russian counter-space capabilities. Therefore, the TB-2 is not a silver bullet for the Ukrainian air force, and its use has been more of a tactical asset than a strategic weapon.
To support his argument, he cites some examples of the TB-2’s limitations and challenges in the war. He mentions that the TB-2 relies on imported and regulated components and technologies, such as engines from Austria and optoelectronics from Canada or Germany, which can be subject to export bans or sanctions. He also mentions that the TB-2’s maximum payload is only 55 kilograms, which limits its ability to carry heavier or more advanced weapons. The TB-2 has been used mainly for reconnaissance and surveillance, rather than for offensive strikes, due to the high risk of being intercepted or shot down by Russian forces.
On the other hand, he highlights the Orlan-10, which has been largely ignored by the Ukrainian and Western media, as a more significant and successful drone in the war. He explains that the Orlan-10 is a short-range tactical drone that can carry various payloads and conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and electronic warfare missions. He notes that the Orlan-10 is resilient to Ukrainian EW and air defenses, which can not detect, jam, or shoot down the drone. He also notes that the Orlan-10 is independent of satellite communications, which can not be disrupted or degraded by Ukrainian counter-space capabilities. Therefore, the Orlan-10 is a more versatile and reliable drone for the Russian army, and its use has been more of a strategic asset than a tactical weapon.
Communication
A third theme of the video is the importance of communication and information in the war, especially the role of Starlink and Russian EW. He analyzes how these two systems have affected the information environment and the command and control of the forces.
He argues that Starlink, which has been used by the Ukrainian and Western forces to provide internet access and communication, has been a mixed blessing for the war effort. He explains that Starlink is a constellation of low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites that can provide high-speed and low-latency internet access to remote areas. He notes that Starlink has enabled the Ukrainian and Western forces to share intelligence, coordinate operations, and communicate with each other and the public. However, he also notes that Starlink has exposed the Ukrainian and Western forces to Russian cyberattacks, propaganda, and disinformation, which can compromise, manipulate, or disrupt their information and communication. Therefore, Starlink is not a panacea for the Ukrainian and Western forces, and its use has been more of a double-edged sword than a single advantage.
One of the ways that Starlink was used to circumvent internet control by the Russians was to provide connectivity to the Ukrainian military in areas where the local internet services and networks had been destroyed or disrupted by the Russian invasion. Starlink terminals were provided to Ukraine for humanitarian purposes, but they were also used for military purposes, such as controlling drones, transmitting data, and accessing online platforms. Starlink also helped the Ukrainian and Western forces to bypass the Russian jamming and spoofing of their radars, radios, and satellites, which reduced their situational awareness and operational effectiveness. Starlink gave the Ukrainian and Western forces an edge over the Russian forces in terms of information and communication, which was crucial for their survival and resistance.
On the other hand, he emphasizes the Russian EW, which has been used by the Russian forces to deny, degrade, and deceive the Ukrainian and Western forces’ information and communication. He explains that Russian EW is a complex and integrated system that can jam, spoof, or hack the Ukrainian and Western forces’ radars, radios, drones, satellites, and networks. He notes that Russian EW has reduced the Ukrainian and Western forces’ situational awareness, operational effectiveness, and strategic decision-making. To counter this, the Ukrainian and Western forces need to improve their own EW capabilities, such as developing more resilient and secure communication systems, deploying more diverse and distributed sensors, and employing more active and passive countermeasures. They also need to enhance their cyber defense and space security, as well as their intelligence and information operations, to prevent or mitigate the effects of Russian EW.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the video by Perun provides a nuanced and insightful analysis of some of the systems that have been used in the war in Ukraine, and challenges some of the common narratives and perceptions about them. He shows that some of the systems that have been hyped up or dismissed by the media or the military may not be as game-changing or failing as they seem, depending on the context and the opportunity costs. He also shows that some of the systems that have been overlooked or underestimated by the media or the military may be more significant and successful than they seem, depending on the situation and the trade-offs. He demonstrates that the war in Ukraine is not a simple or straightforward conflict, but a complex and dynamic one, where different systems have different roles and impacts, and where the outcome is not predetermined or predictable.
