How Ukraine can win the war against Russia
The war between Ukraine and Russia has been raging for almost two years, since Russia’s surprise invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The conflict has become the largest and deadliest in Europe since World War II, causing tens of thousands of civilian and military casualties, displacing millions of people, and threatening global stability and security. Russia’s objective is to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty and democracy, and to expand its influence and control over the region. Ukraine’s objective is to defend its territorial integrity and national identity, and to preserve its European integration and aspirations.
Many observers and analysts have portrayed the war as a hopeless and unequal struggle for Ukraine, given Russia’s overwhelming military and economic superiority. However, this view is based on a misconception of Russia’s actual power and capabilities, and ignores Ukraine’s potential and resilience. In this opinion piece, I will argue that Russia’s capacity to make war is not the same as its actual frontline combat power, and that Ukraine has a chance to win a war of attrition against Russia if it receives enough Western support. I will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in the war, and propose a strategy for Ukraine to achieve victory.
To understand the dynamics of the war, it is useful to employ a metaphor that was coined by the American oceanographer Wallace Broecker in the context of climate change: the metaphor of two barrels and a conveyor belt. According to this metaphor, Russia’s capacity to make war can be represented by a large barrel filled with water, which symbolizes its vast resources, population, and military potential. Ukraine’s capacity to make war can be represented by a small barrel filled with water, which symbolizes its limited resources, population, and military potential. The conveyor belt represents the process of converting capacity into frontline power, which involves mobilizing, training, equipping, deploying, and sustaining forces in the field. The water that flows from the barrels to the conveyor belt represents the actual combat power that each side can bring to bear on the enemy.
The metaphor illustrates two important points: first, that Russia’s capacity to make war is much greater than Ukraine’s, but that does not mean that its frontline power is proportionally greater; second, that the conveyor belt is faulty and inefficient, and that there are many factors that can reduce or disrupt the flow of water from the barrels to the conveyor belt. In other words, Russia’s capacity to make war is not the same as its actual frontline combat power, and that Ukraine has a chance to win a war of attrition against Russia if it can exploit the weaknesses of Russia’s conveyor belt and enhance the efficiency of its own.
There are three possible ways for Ukraine to defeat Russia in a war of attrition: by attacking the large barrel of capacity, by attacking the conveyor belt of conversion, or by attacking the small barrel of frontline power. Each option has its pros and cons, and requires different means and methods.
The first option is to attack the large barrel of capacity, which means to target Russia’s resources, population, and military potential. This can be done by imposing economic sanctions, conducting cyberattacks, supporting insurgencies, and launching strategic strikes. The aim is to reduce Russia’s ability to sustain a prolonged war effort, and to erode its political and social stability. The advantage of this option is that it can have a significant and lasting impact on Russia’s war-making capacity, and that it can avoid direct confrontation with Russia’s forces. The disadvantage of this option is that it can take a long time to produce tangible results, and that it can provoke a strong and violent reaction from Russia, which can escalate the conflict and endanger Ukraine’s security.
The second option is to attack the conveyor belt of conversion, which means to target the process of converting capacity into frontline power. This can be done by disrupting Russia’s mobilization, training, equipping, deploying, and sustaining of forces in the field. The aim is to reduce Russia’s ability to generate and maintain a high level of combat power, and to create gaps and vulnerabilities in its force structure. The advantage of this option is that it can have a direct and immediate impact on Russia’s frontline power, and that it can exploit Russia’s weaknesses and inefficiencies in the conversion process. The disadvantage of this option is that it can be difficult and risky to execute, and that it can face strong and effective resistance from Russia, which can protect and reinforce its conveyor belt.
The third option is to attack the small barrel of frontline power, which means to target Russia’s actual combat power in the field. This can be done by engaging Russia’s forces in conventional and unconventional warfare, using a combination of defensive and offensive operations. The aim is to deplete Russia’s frontline power by inflicting casualties, destroying equipment, and capturing territory. The advantage of this option is that it can have a visible and measurable impact on Russia’s frontline power, and that it can leverage Ukraine’s strengths and advantages in the field. The disadvantage of this option is that it can be costly and exhausting to sustain, and that it can face a numerical and qualitative disadvantage against Russia, which can replenish and augment its frontline power.
Of the three options, I argue that the third one is the most feasible and effective for Ukraine to win a war of attrition against Russia. This is because Ukraine has a realistic chance to exploit Russia’s weaknesses and leverage its own strengths in terms of air defense, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities. These are the three domains that can make a decisive difference in the outcome of the war, and that can give Ukraine an edge over Russia in the field.
Air defense is the key to denying Russia air superiority, which is essential for its offensive operations and force projection. Ukraine has a robust and modern air defense system, consisting of a network of radars, missiles, and anti-aircraft guns, as well as a fleet of fighter jets and drones. Ukraine has successfully shot down dozens of Russian aircraft and drones, and has deterred many more from entering its airspace. Ukraine has also received advanced air defense systems from the US and its allies, such as the Patriot and the Iron Dome, which can further enhance its capabilities.
Electronic warfare is the key to disrupting Russia’s command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) systems, which are vital for its coordination and situational awareness. Ukraine has a sophisticated and innovative electronic warfare capability, consisting of a range of jammers, decoys, and spoofers, as well as a team of hackers and cyber experts. Ukraine has successfully jammed and hacked Russia’s radio, radar, GPS, and satellite signals, and has created confusion and chaos in its ranks. Ukraine has also received advanced electronic warfare systems from the US and its allies, which can further enhance its capabilities.
Cyber warfare is the key to attacking Russia’s critical infrastructure and strategic assets, which are crucial for its war effort and economic stability. Ukraine has a formidable and creative cyber warfare capability, consisting of a network of hackers, activists, and patriots, as well as a partnership with NATO and other countries. Ukraine has successfully launched cyberattacks against Russia’s power grid, oil and gas pipelines, banking system, and military installations, and has caused significant damage and disruption.
By using these three domains, Ukraine can attack the small barrel of frontline power, and deplete Russia’s actual combat power in the field. Ukraine can also combine these domains with conventional and unconventional warfare, using a mix of defensive and offensive operations. Ukraine can defend its territory and population with its army, navy, and national guard, which are well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated. Ukraine can also conduct guerrilla and sabotage operations behind enemy lines, using its special forces, volunteers, and partisans, which are experienced, resourceful, and determined. Ukraine can also launch counterattacks and offensives to recapture lost ground and to pressure Russia’s flanks and rear, using its mobile and mechanized units, which are agile, flexible, and resilient.
Some might object that this strategy is too risky, too costly, or too dependent on external factors. They might argue that attacking the small barrel of frontline power could provoke Russia to escalate the conflict, and to use its nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction. They might argue that it could exhaust Ukraine’s resources and manpower, and to undermine its economy and society or that it could rely too much on Western support and assistance, and to expose Ukraine to political and diplomatic pressure and interference.
These objections are not convincing, for several reasons. First, Russia is unlikely to escalate the conflict to the level of nuclear war, because it knows that it would face a devastating retaliation from the US and its allies, and that it would risk a global catastrophe and condemnation. Russia is also unlikely to use other means of mass destruction, because it knows that it would face a strong and unified response from the international community, and that it would lose any legitimacy and credibility. Second, Ukraine is capable of sustaining a war of attrition against Russia, because it has a large and patriotic population, a diversified and resilient economy, and a vibrant and democratic society. Ukraine is also capable of mobilizing its resources and manpower, because it has a strong and effective leadership, a unified and determined nation, and a supportive and generous diaspora. Third, Ukraine is not dependent on Western support and assistance, because it has a sovereign and independent foreign policy, a strategic and equal partnership with NATO and the EU, and a mutual and beneficial relationship with the US and its allies. Ukraine is also grateful for the weapons and ammunition that it has received from the West, which have helped it to attack the small barrel of frontline power and to win the war of attrition against Russia.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that Russia’s capacity to make war is not the same as its actual frontline combat power, and that Ukraine has a chance to win a war of attrition against Russia if it receives enough Western support. I have analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in the war, and proposed a strategy for Ukraine to attack the small barrel of frontline power, by exploiting Russia’s weaknesses and leveraging its own strengths in terms of air defense, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities. I have also addressed some potential objections and counterarguments, and explained why they are not convincing.
The war between Ukraine and Russia is not a hopeless and unequal struggle for Ukraine, but a realistic and achievable challenge. Ukraine can win the war of attrition against Russia, and secure its sovereignty and democracy, if it receives more weapons and ammunition from the US and its allies. This would speed up the process of depleting Russia’s frontline power and end the war sooner. The US and its allies should not delay or deny this aid, as it would prolong the suffering and bloodshed of the Ukrainian people, and endanger the stability and security of the region and the world. The US and its allies should act now, and provide Ukraine with the means and the support to win the war against Russia. This is not only a moral duty, but also a strategic interest. As the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said in his recent speech to the UN General Assembly: “The war in Ukraine is not only about Ukraine. It is about the future of Europe and the world. It is about the values and principles that we share and cherish. It is about the freedom and dignity of every human being.”
