How Russia’s Special Forces Suffered Heavy Losses in Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2024 was supposed to be a swift and decisive operation that would secure Moscow’s interests in the region and deter further Western interference. However, the war soon turned into a bloody and protracted conflict that exposed the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Russia’s military, especially its elite special forces.
Russia’s special forces, or Spetsnaz, are highly trained and well-equipped units that are often deployed for covert and high-risk missions. They include the airborne forces (VDV), the naval infantry (Morskaya Pekhota), the GRU military intelligence (GU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB). These units have a long history of involvement in conflicts such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria, as well as the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the covert intervention in the Donbas region of Ukraine.
In the 2022 invasion, Russia’s special forces were given the task of leading the advance towards Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, as well as conducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and subversion operations behind enemy lines. They were also expected to coordinate with the Wagner Group, a private military company that has been widely described as a mercenary organization with close ties to the Kremlin and the Russian military.
However, Russia’s special forces soon faced fierce resistance from the Ukrainian armed forces and volunteer battalions, as well as NATO and EU support in the form of intelligence, equipment, and sanctions. The Ukrainian defenders employed a variety of tactics, such as ambushes, snipers, drones, artillery, and special operations, to inflict heavy casualties on the Russian invaders and slow down their progress.
According to open source material and NATO intelligence, some of the elite Russian units based along NATO’s borders suffered casualty rates of 30 to 40 percent in the first four months of the war. For example, the 76th Air Assault Division, based in Pskov, lost its commanding officer, Col Sergei Sukharev, and many of its troops in the battles for the Kyiv suburbs of Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel, where they faced brutal urban warfare and atrocities committed by both sides. The 331st Guards Parachute Regiment, based in Kostroma, also lost at least 40 of its members, including its commander, Maj Sergei Krylov, in the same area. The 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, based in Kubinka, was also heavily involved in the fighting for Kyiv and reportedly suffered significant losses.
The high casualty rate among Russia’s special forces had several consequences for the war and for Russia itself. First, it undermined the morale and cohesion of the Russian military, as well as the public support for the war at home. Many of the fallen soldiers were professionals under contract, who had joined the army for better pay and benefits, not for ideological reasons. Their deaths sparked anger and grief among their families and communities, who often had to deal with the secrecy and bureaucracy of the Russian authorities. Some of the relatives and friends of the dead soldiers took to social media to express their frustration and demand accountability from the Kremlin.
Second, it depleted the quality and quantity of Russia’s special forces, which are considered the backbone of its military and its deterrence posture. As the war dragged on, Russia had to replace the experienced and skilled troops with conscripts and reservists, who had less training and motivation. This reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of Russia’s special operations and increased the risk of mistakes and failures. Moreover, it raised questions about Russia’s ability to sustain a prolonged and intensive conflict, as well as to confront potential threats from other directions, such as NATO and China.
Third, it exposed the flaws and limitations of Russia’s military doctrine and strategy, which relied heavily on the use of special forces for achieving quick and decisive outcomes. Russia’s special forces were not prepared for the complexity and intensity of the war in Ukraine, which required not only conventional warfare, but also hybrid warfare, involving information, cyber, economic, and political dimensions. Russia’s special forces also lacked the support and coordination of other branches of the military, such as the air force, the navy, and the ground forces, which were either absent or ineffective in the war.
