How Putin’s Chechen Wars Foreshadowed His Ukraine Invasion
The current crisis in Ukraine has drawn comparisons with the previous wars in Chechnya, a region in the Caucasus that sought independence from Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s. In this blog post, I will argue that Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, is using the same playbook in Ukraine as he did in Chechnya, and that his first war in Chechnya can teach us a lot about what could be ahead in Ukraine.
Putin’s Rise to Power and the First Chechen War
Putin’s political career began in the late 1980s, when he worked as an adviser to Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg and a prominent reformer. After Sobchak lost his re-election bid in 1996, Putin moved to Moscow and quickly rose through the ranks of the Kremlin, holding various positions in the presidential administration and the security services. In 1998, he became the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the main successor of the KGB, the Soviet secret police. In 1999, he was appointed as the prime minister by Boris Yeltsin, the first president of Russia, who was suffering from poor health and low popularity. A few months later, Yeltsin resigned and named Putin as his successor, making him the acting president of Russia.
Putin’s rise to power coincided with a major crisis in the North Caucasus, where Chechnya, a small republic with a predominantly Muslim population, had declared its independence from Russia in 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chechnya had fought a bloody war with Russia from 1994 to 1996, which ended with a ceasefire agreement that granted Chechnya de facto autonomy, but not formal recognition. In August 1999, a group of Chechen rebels, led by the warlord Shamil Basayev, invaded the neighboring region of Dagestan, which was part of Russia, and declared an Islamic state. This provoked a strong response from Moscow, which accused the Chechen government of supporting the invasion and launched a military campaign to restore its control over Chechnya.
Putin seized the opportunity to present himself as a decisive and strong leader, who could defend Russia’s territorial integrity and national security. He portrayed the war in Chechnya as a fight against terrorism and extremism, and vowed to pursue the rebels “wherever they are”. He also used the war to boost his popularity and legitimacy, as he faced an upcoming presidential election in 2000. He received widespread support from the Russian public and media, who rallied behind his slogan “A strong president — a strong Russia”. He also benefited from a series of apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities in September 1999, which killed hundreds of civilians and were blamed on the Chechen rebels, although some critics have suggested that the FSB was behind the attacks to create a pretext for the war. Putin won the presidential election in March 2000 with 53% of the vote, becoming the second president of Russia.
Putin’s Tactics and the Second Chechen War
Putin’s strategy in Chechnya was based on a combination of overwhelming force, indiscriminate bombing, proxy militias, and propaganda. He deployed more than 100,000 troops, backed by tanks, artillery, and aircraft, to crush the Chechen resistance. He also relied on local allies, such as the pro-Russian Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov, who commanded a militia of former rebels who switched sides and fought against their former comrades. Putin also ignored international criticism and human rights violations, and refused to negotiate with the Chechen leaders, such as Aslan Maskhadov, the elected president of Chechnya, who had signed the ceasefire agreement with Yeltsin in 1996. Putin claimed that there was no political solution to the conflict, and that the only way to end the war was to eliminate the “bandits” and “terrorists”.
Putin’s tactics proved effective in achieving his military objectives, but at a high cost for both sides. According to various estimates, the war in Chechnya claimed the lives of up to 100,000 civilians and 20,000 Russian soldiers, and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. The war also destroyed much of Chechnya’s infrastructure and economy, and left the region in ruins. The capital city of Grozny, once home to half a million people, was reduced to rubble. By 2000, Putin had succeeded in taking over most of Chechnya and installing a loyal regime in Grozny, headed by Kadyrov, who was later assassinated in 2004 and replaced by his son Ramzan, who continues to rule Chechnya with an iron fist and the support of Moscow. In 2002, Putin declared the end of the military operation in Chechnya, and in 2003, he held a referendum that approved a new constitution that affirmed Chechnya’s status as part of Russia, but granted it some degree of autonomy.
However, Putin’s victory in Chechnya was not complete, nor lasting. A significant number of Chechen rebels continued to resist the Russian occupation, and launched a series of attacks both inside and outside Chechnya, targeting Russian military and civilian targets. Some of the most notorious attacks included the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis, in which 130 hostages and 40 rebels died; the 2004 Beslan school siege, in which more than 330 people, mostly children, were killed; and the 2010 Moscow metro bombings, in which 40 people died. The rebels also expanded their operations to other regions of the North Caucasus, such as Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, where they sought to establish an Islamic state, known as the Caucasus Emirate, under the leadership of Doku Umarov, who declared himself the emir of the region and the enemy of Russia. The rebels also developed links with international jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and some of them joined the Syrian civil war as foreign fighters.
Putin’s Playbook and the Ukraine Invasion
Putin’s playbook in Chechnya has been replicated in Ukraine, where he has applied similar tactics and pursued similar goals. Ukraine, a former Soviet republic with a population of about 44 million, has been divided between a pro-Western and a pro-Russian orientation since its independence in 1991. The pro-Western camp, which is dominant in the western and central regions of the country, seeks to integrate Ukraine into the European Union and NATO, and to reduce its dependence on Russia. The pro-Russian camp, which is prevalent in the eastern and southern regions of the country, especially in Crimea and Donbas, favors maintaining close ties with Russia and preserving the status of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine. The division between the two camps has been a source of political instability and social unrest in Ukraine, and has been exploited by Putin to advance his interests and agenda.
Putin’s intervention in Ukraine began in 2014, after a popular uprising, known as the Euromaidan Revolution, ousted the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, who had refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union, and replaced him with a pro-Western government, led by Petro Poroshenko. Putin saw this as a threat to his vision of a “Greater Russia”, which includes Ukraine as a key part of its historical and cultural legacy, and as a buffer zone against NATO expansion. He also feared losing his influence and interests in Ukraine, especially his access to the Black Sea and the naval base in Sevastopol, which hosts the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Putin responded by annexing Crimea, a peninsula in the south of Ukraine, where the majority of the population is ethnically Russian and supports Russia. He also supported pro-Russian rebels in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where a large number of Russian speakers live and where many industrial and natural resources are located. He provided the rebels with weapons, funds, and fighters, some of whom were Russian soldiers in disguise, and helped them establish two self-proclaimed republics, known as the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, which are not recognized by the international community.
Putin’s Risks and the World’s Response
Putin’s playbook in Ukraine is risky and dangerous, and it could lead to a full-scale war that would have devastating consequences for the region and the world. Ukraine is not Chechnya, and it has a much larger and stronger army, which is backed by the West and by millions of patriotic citizens, who are ready to defend their country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukraine is also not alone, and it has the support of many countries and organizations, such as the United States, the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations, which have condemned Russia’s aggression and imposed sanctions on Russia’s economy and officials. The West has also provided Ukraine with diplomatic, financial, and military assistance, such as weapons, training, and intelligence, and has pledged to increase its presence and deterrence in the region.
Putin has shown that he is not interested in a genuine dialogue and compromise with the West and with Ukraine, and that he is only using diplomacy as a cover and a distraction for his aggressive actions and intentions. Putin has also shown that he is not concerned about the humanitarian and economic costs of his intervention in Ukraine, and that he is willing to sacrifice the lives and livelihoods of millions of people, both in Ukraine and in Russia, for his personal and political ambitions.
The people of Ukraine, and the world, need to be aware of Putin’s playbook and his risks, and to be prepared for the worst-case scenario, which is a war between Russia and the West. The people of Ukraine, and the world, also need to stand by Ukraine and to support its struggle for freedom and democracy, and to help it resist Russia’s aggression and interference.
