How Marxism and Leninism Shaped the Mechanistic and Deterministic Approach of Russian Foreign Policy
In the swirling currents of the modern world, where ideologies born in the smoky factories of the Industrial Revolution still cast long shadows over international landscapes, the twin towers of Marxism and Leninism stand as beacons of radical thought. These ideologies, constructed in the fertile minds of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and later reframed by Vladimir Lenin, stir heated debates and challenge the existing social order, offering a vision of a future free from the chains of capitalism. Marxism and Leninism are often associated with communism and socialism, but they have distinct features and implications. Marxism advocates for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, leading to a classless society where the means of production are owned and controlled by the workers. Leninism, on the other hand, is a political theory that was developed by Lenin in the early 20th century, which proposed the concept of the vanguard party: an elite group of revolutionaries who would lead the masses toward their historical destiny. Leninism also adapted Marxism to the conditions of Russia and the imperialist era, and influenced the formation of the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
Marxism, with its grand narrative of history, views human societies through the lens of class struggles, with economic forces as the great puppeteers of social change. At its heart lies a prophecy — the fall of the capitalist order, as inevitable as the fall of Rome, brought about by the collective awakening and uprising of the proletariat. It is a world view that reduces the complex web of history to a battle between oppressor and oppressed, a view where the hammer of revolution would one day shatter the chains of exploitation. This view was influenced by the writings of French historians such as Adolphe Thiers and François Guizot on the French Revolution of 1789, which Marx saw as a model of class conflict and historical transformation. Marx also developed his theory of historical materialism, which holds that the mode of production determines the social and political relations of a given society. Marx’s analysis of capitalism was based on his critique of political economy, which he outlined in his magnum opus, Das Kapital.
Leninism, a branch from the Marxist tree, finds its uniqueness not in the dismissal of its parent ideology, but in its strategic adaptations. Lenin’s genius — or his most criticized innovation, depending on one’s perspective — was his concept of the vanguard party: an elite cadre of revolutionaries equipped with the consciousness to lead the masses toward their inevitable historical destiny. Where Marx envisioned a spontaneous upheaval, Lenin foresaw a directed burst of revolutionary zeal, with his party as the spearhead piercing the heart of the bourgeois state. The vanguard party, according to Lenin, was necessary to overcome the false consciousness and reformism of the working class, and to provide the practical and political leadership that would impel them to achieve a communist revolution. The vanguard party was also supposed to be highly disciplined, centralized, and democratic, following the principle of democratic centralism. The vanguard party model was adopted by many communist parties around the world, especially during the Third International, but also faced criticism from other Marxists, anarchists, and democratic socialists.
The concepts of mechanism and determinism, cornerstones in the grand edifice of these ideologies, bring a scientific sheen to the political discourse. They suggest a world ticking along to the iron laws of historical development, a clockwork universe where human agency is but a cog in a much larger machine. In such a world, the revolution is not a question of if, but when; not a matter of human choice, but a determined outcome of historical processes.
This deterministic view has permeated the depths of Russian political and military decision-making, with echoes resounding through the chambers of the Kremlin. It is a mindset that seeks to distill the chaos of geopolitics into a predictable pattern, a belief that the right analysis of material conditions and class relations can forecast — and indeed, mandate — the correct course of action. It is a way of thinking that underpinned Soviet strategies, from the revolution itself to the cold calculus of the Cold War.
Yet, as with any ideology, the rigidity of mechanism and determinism has its perils. The unfolding of events is rarely as obedient as a theory might predict. In the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, for example, the projections of Marxist-Leninist theory collided with the messy reality of human society. It was a lesson in the limits of deterministic thought, a costly reminder that the heartbeat of history is not always in rhythm with the drumbeat of theory. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which began on Christmas Eve 1979, was a military intervention to support the pro-Soviet government against the anti-communist Mujahideen guerrillas. The invasion sparked international condemnation and a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The war lasted for almost a decade, and resulted in over 14,000 Soviet casualties and over 150,000 Afghan deaths. The war also contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of Islamic extremism.
In the final analysis, mechanism and determinism in the ideologies of Marxism and Leninism serve as guiding stars for a certain approach to policy and action. They provide a framework, a set of expectations about the world and its future. But they are not destiny. Russian decision-making, both historical and contemporary, is a tapestry with threads of ideology, yes, but also culture, psychology, and the inescapable unpredictability of human affairs. Moreover, Russian decision-making is influenced by other factors, such as geopolitics, security, and economic interests.
