From Nuclear Deterrence to Nuclear Coercion: A Dangerous Shift in Global Politics

Nuclear weapons have been a central feature of international security since the end of World War II. For decades, the dominant logic of nuclear strategy has been deterrence: the idea that the threat of nuclear retaliation would prevent adversaries from launching a nuclear attack or a major conventional war. Deterrence relies on the assumption that nuclear weapons are only useful for self-defense and that no rational actor would risk a nuclear war that could result in mutual annihilation.

However, in recent years, some nuclear-armed states have been challenging this logic and pursuing a more aggressive and assertive use of nuclear weapons for coercion: the idea that the threat or show of nuclear force can compel adversaries to change their behavior or accept unfavorable outcomes. Coercion relies on the assumption that nuclear weapons can be used for offensive purposes and that some actors are willing to escalate to the nuclear level to achieve their goals.

Two prominent examples of nuclear coercion are Russia and China, both of whom have been rattling their nuclear sabers in the last several months. Russia has been using nuclear threats and posturing to intimidate its neighbors, especially those in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, and to deter NATO from intervening in its conflicts with Ukraine and Georgia. Russia has also been modernizing its nuclear arsenal and developing new types of weapons, such as hypersonic missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes, that could bypass existing defenses and pose new challenges for deterrence. China has been using nuclear coercion to assert its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, where it faces disputes with several countries, including Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China has also been expanding and diversifying its nuclear forces, such as deploying multiple-warhead missiles and developing a nuclear triad of land, sea, and air-based delivery systems, that could enhance its ability to launch a nuclear first strike or a limited nuclear war.

The shift from nuclear deterrence to nuclear coercion poses a serious threat to global peace and stability. Nuclear coercion increases the risk of nuclear escalation, miscalculation, and accidents, as well as undermines the norms and institutions that have prevented the use of nuclear weapons for over 75 years. Nuclear coercion also challenges the credibility and effectiveness of the existing nuclear order, which is based on the principles of non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control. The international community needs to respond to this dangerous trend and reaffirm its commitment to nuclear deterrence and non-use. Some possible steps include:

• Strengthening the nuclear taboo: The nuclear taboo is the norm that constrains countries from using nuclear weapons in a first strike. According to a survey of US national security officials and international relations scholars, most respondents are confident that the nuclear taboo influences the behavior of nuclear-armed states, but the intensity varies by the country in question. The international community should reinforce the nuclear taboo by condemning any nuclear threats or provocations, reaffirming the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear war, and promoting the universalization and implementation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in January 2021.
• Enhancing the credibility of deterrence: The credibility of deterrence depends on the ability and willingness of a country to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack. The international community should enhance the credibility of deterrence by maintaining a secure and effective nuclear posture, improving the communication and coordination among allies and partners, and developing new capabilities and concepts to counter the emerging nuclear threats from Russia and China, such as missile defense, cyber warfare, and conventional precision strike.
• Pursuing dialogue and cooperation: Dialogue and cooperation are essential to reduce the tensions and mistrust that fuel nuclear coercion. The international community should pursue dialogue and cooperation with Russia and China on various issues of mutual interest and concern, such as strategic stability, crisis management, nuclear risk reduction, and arms control. The recent extension of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia, which limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, is a positive step in this direction. The international community should also explore the possibility of engaging China in multilateral nuclear talks, as well as other regional actors, such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea, who also possess nuclear weapons or aspire to acquire them.

The world is facing a dangerous shift from nuclear deterrence to nuclear coercion, which could undermine the global security and stability that have been maintained since the end of World War II. The international community needs to act urgently and decisively to reverse this trend and preserve the nuclear order that has prevented the use of nuclear weapons for over 75 years.