Dick Cheney’s Controversial Opposition to the 1997 Chemical Weapons Treaty: A Deep Dive into a Divisive Debate
In 1997, Dick Cheney, then CEO of Halliburton and future Vice President of the United States, voiced vehement opposition to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international treaty aimed at banning the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. Cheney’s opposition was outlined in a letter to Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wherein he argued that the CWC would be ineffective and potentially harmful to U.S. national security.
Cheney’s opposition was driven by a belief that the treaty would primarily bind nations that were not threats to the U.S., while rogue states like Iran, North Korea, and Libya would either not join or would violate its terms. He feared that the CWC would inadvertently aid these nations by granting them access to chemical technologies under the guise of compliance. This stance was part of a broader narrative pushed by Cheney and other conservative figures, emphasizing the treaty’s alleged weaknesses and potential risks.
Critics of Cheney’s position argue that his stance was influenced by a broader agenda to maintain military and corporate advantages. Halliburton, under Cheney’s leadership, stood to benefit from less restrictive international regulations on chemical technologies and industries. Additionally, his alignment with other hawkish figures such as Donald Rumsfeld and Steve Forbes, who also opposed the treaty, suggests a concerted effort to undermine arms control measures that might constrain U.S. military capabilities or impose regulatory burdens on U.S. businesses.
Cheney’s arguments against the CWC included concerns about verification and compliance. He suggested that verification would be next to impossible, and clandestine violations by rogue states would be difficult to detect. This perspective was shared by other critics who believed that the treaty would expose the U.S. to industrial espionage and create significant compliance costs for American businesses. Estimates suggested that compliance could cost the government up to $200 million annually and impose billions in costs on businesses, while potentially compromising constitutional rights through intrusive inspections.
Despite these objections, the treaty garnered significant support from various quarters, including former Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, and was ultimately ratified by the Senate on April 24, 1997. Proponents argued that the treaty, though not without its flaws, represented a critical step towards global disarmament and the reduction of chemical warfare threats. The support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and various veterans’ organizations underscored a broader consensus that the benefits of the treaty outweighed the risks.
In retrospect, Cheney’s opposition to the CWC can be seen as part of a pattern of prioritizing military and corporate interests over global disarmament efforts. His stance reflected a broader ideological divide on how best to ensure national security, with Cheney and his allies favoring unilateral measures and maintaining military superiority over multilateral agreements and cooperative security frameworks. This episode is a stark reminder of the complexities and controversies inherent in international arms control agreements and the often competing interests that shape their outcomes.
