China’s Dilemma in the Red Sea Crisis
The Red Sea crisis, triggered by the Houthi rebels’ attacks on commercial ships in the vital trade route, has posed a serious challenge to China’s interests and influence in the Middle East. While the US and the UK have launched airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen, China has remained largely silent and passive, despite being more affected by the disruption of the Red Sea than any other country. Why is China so reluctant to take a more active role in resolving the crisis, and what are the risks and opportunities for Beijing in this complex situation?
China is arguably the most angry country at the Houthi attacks, as they directly threaten its global trade, energy security, regional stability, and diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. According to the Atlantic Council, the Red Sea is one of the main trade routes between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, with 10 percent of world trade by volume utilizing this route. This includes 20 percent of all container shipping, nearly 10 percent of seaborne oil, and 8 percent of LNG. China is the largest trading partner of both the European Union and the Middle East, and relies heavily on the Red Sea for its imports and exports. The Houthi attacks have forced many shipping companies to divert their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of miles and millions of dollars to their journeys. This could have a negative impact on China’s economic growth, inflation, and supply chains.
Moreover, China is the largest importer of oil and gas from the Middle East, and has invested billions of dollars in energy infrastructure and projects in the region. The Red Sea is also a key corridor for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe through a network of roads, railways, ports, and pipelines. The Houthi attacks could jeopardize China’s energy security and its BRI ambitions, as well as undermine its reputation as a reliable partner and investor in the region.
Furthermore, China has a stake in maintaining regional stability and peace in the Middle East, as it affects its own security and interests. China has been involved in various diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts to resolve conflicts and crises in the region, such as the Iran nuclear deal, the Syrian civil war, the Qatar-Gulf rift, and the Yemeni peace process. China has also established strategic partnerships and comprehensive cooperation agreements with several Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. The Red Sea crisis could escalate the tensions and violence in the region, and complicate China’s delicate balancing act among its diverse and often rival partners.
Given these stakes, one would expect China to play a more constructive and responsible role in keeping the shipping lanes safe in the Red Sea, as it has stated in the UN Security Council. However, China has been largely silent and passive about the Houthi attacks, and has not joined the US-led maritime coalition to protect navigation in the region. China has also refrained from condemning the Houthis by name, even when a Chinese ship was attacked in December 2023. Why is China so cautious and restrained in its response to the crisis?
One possible explanation is that China does not want to antagonize Iran, the Houthis’ main ally and sponsor, or lose its influence in the Global South. China and Iran have a strategic partnership that involves economic, political, and security cooperation. China is Iran’s largest trading partner and oil customer, and has supported Iran in the face of US sanctions and pressure. China also views Iran as a key partner in its BRI vision and its regional connectivity plans. China does not want to jeopardize its relations with Iran by siding with the US and its allies against the Houthis, or by appearing to interfere in Iran’s sphere of influence.
Another possible explanation is that China is wary of the risks and costs of getting more involved in the crisis, and prefers to let the US and its allies bear the burden and the blame. China has a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and has been reluctant to use military force or coercion in its foreign policy. China may also doubt the effectiveness and legitimacy of the US-led airstrikes against the Houthis, and fear the potential backlash and consequences of such actions. China may also hope to benefit from the crisis by offering itself as a neutral and alternative mediator and partner in the region, and by exploiting the gaps and opportunities created by the disruption of the Red Sea.
However, China’s silence and passivity in the face of the crisis may not be sustainable or wise in the long run. China’s position could change if the Houthi attacks escalate or target Chinese ships directly, or if the crisis threatens China’s core interests and security. It may also face growing pressure and criticism from the international community, especially from its trading partners and allies in the region, for its lack of action and responsibility. China may also lose its credibility and influence in the region, and miss the chance to shape the outcome of the crisis in its favor.
