Airbus Industrie Flight 129: A Comprehensive Analysis of the First Fatal Accident Involving an Airbus A330

Photo by Fasyah Halim on Unsplash

Introduction

Airbus Industrie Flight 129 was a test flight of an Airbus A330–321 aircraft that resulted in a tragic crash on 30 June 1994 at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport. The accident claimed the lives of all seven people on board, including pilots, engineers, and Airbus executives. This event marked the first fatal accident involving an Airbus A330 and the first hull loss of the type, making it a significant event in the history of aviation. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the aircraft involved, the test objectives, the crash itself, and the investigation that followed.

Aircraft

The aircraft involved in the accident was an Airbus A330–321, registration F-WWKH, and construction number 42. It was equipped with twin Pratt & Whitney PW4164 powerplants and first took flight on 14 October 1993. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was 259 days old. The aircraft belonged to Thai Airways International and was being flight-tested under an agreement with the owner. This arrangement was due to Airbus Industrie owing compensation to Thai Airways for the hull loss of another plane it had damaged during testing in December 1993.

Test Objectives

The primary objective of Flight 129 was to test the performance of the aircraft in simulated engine failures after takeoff. This involved throttling down one of the aircraft’s engines to idle and switching off a hydraulic circuit. During most of the tests, the aircraft’s autopilot would be set to fly the plane to an altitude of 2,000 feet (610 m). The particular test that led to the crash was conducted with the plane’s center of gravity near its aft limit, achieved by carrying tons of water in bladders in the rear of the aircraft’s cabin.

The flight crew consisted of Captain Nick Warner, Airbus chief test pilot, Co-pilot Michel Cais, an Air Inter training captain who had been working with the Airbus training organization Aeroformation, and Flight Test Engineer Jean-Pierre Petit.

Airbus management, confident in the aircraft’s performance and eager to promote it to potential customers, invited four passengers on the plane: two Airbus executives, Philippe Tournoux and Keith Hulse, and two Alitalia pilots, Alberto Nassetti and Pier Paolo Racchetti, who were in Toulouse for a commercial training program at the Airbus headquarters.

Crash

Flight 129 had just successfully completed a landing after Captain Warner performed two simulated engine loss go-arounds, taking a total of 55 minutes. The second takeoff was made with the aircraft’s center of gravity located in an extreme aft position. This time, Co-pilot Cais flew the aircraft while Captain Warner carried out the actions to shut off the engine and hydraulic circuit, and engage the autopilot.

The takeoff was completed successfully, and Captain Warner shut off the engine and hydraulic circuit. After three attempts, the autopilot was engaged, and the aircraft began to ascend to 2,000 feet (600 m). However, the aircraft climbed too steeply, causing the airspeed to drop to 100 knots (120 mph; 190 km/h), below the minimum 118 knots required to maintain control. The aircraft started to roll, and the crew reduced power on the operating engine to counter the thrust asymmetry. This action only worsened the problem, causing the aircraft to pitch down 15 degrees and crash into the ground shortly after. All seven people on board were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed.

Investigation

The crash was investigated by a commission of enquiry within the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), the French Government Defense procurement and technology agency responsible for investigating flight test accidents. The commission found that the crash was due to “a combination of several factors, no one of which, in isolation, would have caused the crash.” These factors included:

• Captain Warner’s fatigue after a busy day, which included an A321 demonstration flight, supervision of a simulator session, and two meetings, including a press briefing;
• Lack of a complete pre-flight briefing, caused by Warner’s schedule, and possible complacency due to the success of the testing through the previous takeoff;
• Choice of maximum takeoff/go-around (TOGA) thrust instead of the slightly lower “Flex 49” setting, resulting in higher than planned thrust asymmetry during the simulated left engine failure;
• Choice of trim setting at 2.2° nose-up, which, although within acceptable limits, was inappropriate for the extreme aft CG configuration flown;
• Autopilot inadvertently left set at 2,000 feet (610 m) altitude capture from the previous test;
• Absence of attitude protection in the autopilot’s altitude capture mode;
• Uncertainty in the allocation of tasks between the captain and co-pilot, with the co-pilot rotating the aircraft “firmly and very fast” to a takeoff attitude of more than 25°, compared to the usual 14.5° used for the first, successful takeoff;
• Captain Warner carrying out test procedures immediately after takeoff: autopilot engagement, throttling back the left engine, and tripping the hydraulic circuit breaker, which temporarily took him “out of the piloting loop;”
• Lack of visual indication of autopilot mode, obscured by the extreme pitch attitude;
• Crew overconfidence in the expected aircraft response;
• Delayed reaction of the test engineer to changes in flight parameters, particularly airspeed;
• Captain’s slowness in reacting to the development of an abnormal situation.

Lessons Learned and Impact on Aviation Safety

The crash of Airbus Industrie Flight 129 had a lasting impact on aviation safety, particularly concerning test flights and the procedures surrounding them. As a result of the investigation, numerous recommendations were made to improve safety and mitigate the risks associated with conducting test flights.

These recommendations included:

• Enhancing pre-flight briefings to ensure thorough understanding of all test objectives and procedures by all members of the crew;
• Implementing stricter fatigue management practices to ensure that pilots and crew are well-rested and alert during test flights;
• Revising autopilot systems to include attitude protection in altitude capture mode;
• Improving visual indications of autopilot mode and other critical flight information;
• Reinforcing the importance of clear task allocation and communication between flight crew members during test flights;
• Emphasizing the need for vigilance and timely response to changes in flight parameters by all crew members.

These measures have contributed to enhancing the safety of test flights and have helped to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. The crash of Flight 129 also highlighted the importance of thorough risk assessment and management when conducting test flights, particularly when non-essential personnel, such as executives and guests, are on board.

In conclusion, the tragic accident of Airbus Industrie Flight 129, while undoubtedly a dark moment in the history of aviation, has ultimately led to significant improvements in test flight safety and risk management. The lessons learned from this event have played a crucial role in shaping the aviation industry’s approach to flight testing and have contributed to making air travel safer for all.